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Systems Analysis of Crime in Trinidad and Tobago,
focusing on the Cocaine Trade
by Keren Carla Charles
Abstract
Crime in Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) has escalated in the 2000s and the government is
struggling to find the best methods to reduce crime and improve national security. Measures
such as hiring an external police commissioner, introducing new bills, community policing and
implementing a state of emergency have all been tried, but it seems as though these steps have all
failed in achieving their desired goals as crime is still increasing. In this paper, I argue that a
systems-thinking approach is needed to understand crime in T&T and to evaluate potential
interventions. Using systems analysis, international and national datasets, system dynamic
models as well as newspaper reports, I review recent experience, compare T&T with other
countries, identify key issues and interactions, and suggest planning recommendations that may
help to reduce crime. This paper is an effort to identify planning strategies that can bring about
sustainable change in T&T.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) is the southernmost island of the Caribbean and it is known
for its beautiful carnival, its friendly people, its beautiful beaches and recently, for having a high
murder rate (UNODC 2007). The murder rate in T&T, which acts as the standard measure for
violent crime due to its consistent reporting and tracking when compared to other crimes, more
than quadrupled in the 2000s allegedly due to the fall-out from the drug trade in the country
(UNODC Homicide dataset 2012). The drug transshipment problem affects not just T&T, but
many of the countries in the Caribbean region. In fact, the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) and local political leaders in the Caribbean have stated that the drug trade is the
biggest source of crime in the region (UNODC 2007, Griffith 2011).
"Nothing poses a greater threat to civil society in CARICOM countries than the drug
problem; and nothing exemplifies the powerlessness of regional government more. This
is the magnitude of the danger drug abuse and drug trafficking hold for our community.
It is a many-layered danger. At base is the human destruction implicit in drug addiction;
but implicit also is the corruption of individuals and systems by the sheer enormity of the
inducement of the illegal drug trade in poor countries." (West India Commission, 1992.)
The Caribbean is ideally located between the major cocaine producers, in South America,
and the major markets, in USA and Europe, and as a result, the transshipment of cocaine through
the region persists. In this thesis, I consider:
- What can the law enforcement in these countries do to help curb the negative fall-out
from the trade?
- What framework could help organizations evaluate possible interdictions in order to
determine the best way to allocate funds?
These questions have plagued government officials in T&T and the Caribbean for at least
a decade, and though I do not claim to have the answer to these questions, I hope to show how
systems analysis techniques and modeling, for example system dynamics, can provide a
framework to determine effective interventions. Systems analysis tries to sort out the
interactions among policy, action and perception. It not only helps to identify which feedback
loops are important, but it also takes into account time delays and tipping points i.e., when rare
phenomena become drastically more common or when the buildup of minor changes or incidents
trigger a major phenomenon (Grodzins 1958, Gladwell 2000). This form of analysis is ideal
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because if there are links between cocaine emergence in the 1980s (Klein 2001) and the
skyrocketing of the murder rate in the 2000s, then a systems approach might provide a
framework for understanding the linkages.
In this thesis, I start by describing the crime situation in T&T and its posited links to the
global cocaine trade. To strengthen the argument that the spillover effect from the illicit
movement of cocaine is harmful, I then look at the Caribbean region and its role in the trade.
Although this paper focuses on T&T and the Caribbean, I briefly show that illicit trade is neither
a new nor a unique problem for the country or the region by looking at the slave trade and the
shipment of illicit goods during colonialism. I also discuss the growing transnational cocaine
trade in West Africa. After providing this global and temporal perspective, I re-focus on T&T
and discuss the various government actions and policies to curb the repercussions of the trade as
well the resulting increase in fear and distrust in the community due to the high crime rates.
T&T provides an interesting case study because in 1999 a major local drug lord and his gang
were tried, convicted and hanged to stem the growth of crime in the country. However, these
deaths may have had the unintended consequence of increasing violence, kidnappings and
murders as rival gangs, which had been suppressed by the major stronghold tried to claim their
part of the business (Figueira 2004). In August 2011, the government of T&T declared a national
state of emergency because of the high rate of murder. To date, the repercussions from of this
state of emergency are still unknown, therefore, a systems analysis approach would be an
essential tool to identify issues and possible consequences.
Further, I use system dynamics literature to analyze potential interventions and to show
that this type of modeling is useful in determining long-term strategies to reduce crime. Finally, I
apply organizational ecosystem theories to suggest a change implementation strategy for the
T&T Police Service (TTPS).
Why cocaine?
My primary reason for choosing the drug trade is its alleged links to the increasing crime
and homicide rates in the Caribbean. The most abused illegal substances in the region are
marijuana, heroin and cocaine (Griffith 1996); however, marijuana has religious and ethnic
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significance in some parts of the Caribbean' (Klein 2001) and records of heroin abuse are
significantly lower than the other two (Griffith 1996). Consequently, I do not look into the trade
or into the impacts of either marijuana or heroin and I focus instead on impacts of the cocaine
trade on the Caribbean and potential analytical models of these impacts in T&T. Although
consumption of cocaine is a problem in T&T, my primary focus is on the impacts of
transshipment as that appears to be the major factor in violence.
The Drug Trade, Crime and Economic Development in the Caribbean
The drug trade affects the Caribbean economically, socially and politically. It increases
the costs of doing business, it reduces external investment and it diminishes confidence in the
governing authorities. Griffith (2011: 6) posits that some Caribbean countries, including T&T,
are being "pushed to the edge of a governance precipice".
Economically
Tourism is one of the biggest sources of revenue for the Caribbean region, according to
the CIA World Factbook (2012). For all countries, excluding Cuba and T&T, tourism is listed as
one of the industries that make a major contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
accounting for up to 60% of the GDP in the case of Antigua & Barbuda and the Bahamas (CIA
World Factbook 2012). Increases in crime and violence reduce the attractiveness of the
Caribbean as a vacation destination and countries suffer economically (Griffith 1995). Although
the nation of T&T does not depend on tourism for economic stability, officials in Tobago, the
smaller of the two isles and a notable tourist destination, worry about the upsurge in crime. In
fact, the President of the Hotel and Tourism Association in Tobago, Carol Ann Birchwood James
stressed that murders in Tobago would negatively affect the arrival of tourists2.
'Rastafarians believe that it is religious herb with spiritual and medicinal value.
2 Allard, Elizabeth W, "Murder 'blow' for tourism", T&T Express Tobago Bureau, February 5, 2011.
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/Murders blow for tourism-I 15357309.html
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Additionally, crime increases the cost of doing business and skews the allocation of
resources (Griffith 1995). Companies that want to invest in the Caribbean are obliged to take
extra protective measures, for example hiring security guards, to ensure that their employees and
property are safe. The President of the T&T Manufacturers' Association commented, "Crime is
a big problem for us, especially if we want to run that night shift." He added, "It is always a
problem to get staff to work that. Some companies have to take steps of providing transport at
great cost to and from the compound for staff and it's a deterrent for multinationals who are
accustomed to working around the clock" 3. In addition, shipping firms and airlines are less
likely to want to operate in the Caribbean, as smugglers would be tempted to use these as
shipment vehicles, which may cause the company to be fined if cocaine is found on the vessels
(Klein 2001). Finally, the government has to spend more money on national security and
healthcare, to keep citizens safe and to deal with victims of crime, respectively; these funds are
taken from other sections of the national budget.
Logically following from this, there has been a growth in private protection firms and
private security mechanisms in the region (Griffith 1995) and, jobs in public security have also
boomed. In fact, T&T Police Commissioner Gibbs said in 2011 that the police to civilian ratio is
very high4 .
Socially
As a result of the increased crime and murders, citizens of T&T are living in fear, and the
quality of life both in T&T and the Caribbean has decreased. For example, people report that
they no longer take public transportation nor do they walk through the streets at night.5 At the
killing of 66-year-old Kenrick Raphael at his home in Freeport T&T one neighbor commented,
"Just look how this country get. This is a safe area...well it was safe. Now we have to be afraid in
3 Bridglal, Carla, "The biggest setback to T&T's growth", T&T Express, July 23, 2012.
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/business-magazine/The biggest setback to T T s growth-163372786.html
4 Kowlessar, Geisha, "Gibbs: More cops not the answer", T&T Guardian, February 4, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/02/04/gibbs-more-cops-not-answer
s Bruzual, Alexander, "Carapo - gun town of East Trinidad", T&T Newsday, July 18, 2012.
http://www.newsday.co.tt/crime and court/0,163468.html.
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our own community, in our own homes," the woman said."6 Crime curbs social activity that
lead to the characteristic congeniality of the 'Caribbean person' that existed in decades prior
within communities and erodes pride of national identity and trust in the government and the
judicial system.
Politically
Although this paper does not delve into the issue of sovereignty, prior literature have
discussed in detail the role of the drug trade and crime in undermining local government
sovereignty (Griffith 1995, Griffith 2011, Klein 2001). This occurs in various ways:
- Crime bosses may step in to meet the needs of the community and thereby gaining the public
support. For example, in 2010, Christopher "Dudus" Coke was a criminal in Jamaica
wanted for extradition to the US. The people of Tivoli Gardens, where he provided
economic support, violently protected him with their lives when the police came for him
(Griffith 2011).
- The society may begin to lose faith in the governing party because the criminals have more
guns, have more money and seem to have better strategies (Klein 2001).
- International law enforcement bodies step in to help countries curb the drug trade,
potentially undermining the local police (Klein 2001, Griffith 1995).
- International institutions demand that countries curb crime and often provide rules that
countries should obey. For example, the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(INCSR) assesses each country's strategy in dealing with their drug problem (INCSR
website) and penalties may be placed on countries deemed to not be adequately trying to
reduce the drug trade (Klein 2001).
These factors play a combined role to contribute to the decrease in development in T&T
and the Caribbean.
6 Moore, Stacy, "Dad of 4 murdered", T&T Newsday, July 18, 2012.
http://www.newsday.co.tt/crime and court/0,163467.html
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Modeling Crime
Since the 1950s and 1960s, the crime analysts in the US have been using quantitative
analysis to examine and predict crime patterns and understand the criminal justice system.
Modeling crime has helped to inform decision makers on how to allocate resources and
manpower; and, it has been used to find bottlenecks in the system (Bard 1977, Blumstein 2002).
In this thesis, I use systems analysis to assess the vulnerabilities of countries to the narco-trade
and I show how system dynamics models can be used to understand some interactions between
various factors and may help determine interventions. Systems analysis, and particularly system
dynamics, provides a good framework for the quantification of stated vulnerabilities in its
capacity to combine expert analysis and expert opinions with empirical data and emphasize
understanding patterns of behavior (Bard 1977, Sterman 2001). It further highlights which
positive feedback loops should be reinforced and which negative loops should be reduced based
on these analyses. Moreover, a systems-wide approach helps to identify the roles that
stakeholders play in aggravating or alleviating crime and this will inform the policy makers who
are determining the solutions to T&T's crime problem.
Chapter Guide
In Chapter 2, "The Drug Trade and Crime in T&T", I use international and national data
as well as newspaper articles to describe crime in the country.
Spillover crime from the cocaine trade is not specific to T&T, and in Chapter 3, "The
Cocaine Trade and Crime in the Caribbean", I discuss how the cocaine trade affects the region.
Morrison (1997) created a metric to determine the likelihood of countries becoming narco-
production-states, I tweak this to analyze the risk of countries becoming narco-transshipment
states using international data sources. This chapter helps to show the dynamics of being part of
a regional system.
In the Chapter 4, "The Global Cocaine trade", I examine the global cocaine trade and
geospatial movement of cocaine based on the data provided by the UNODC, literature on the
drug trade and news articles. I show that the ill effects are not specific to the Caribbean, by
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briefly discussing the cocaine transshipment ramifications in West Africa, and I show that it is
not specific to this time, by briefly discussing the movement of people and goods across the
Atlantic Ocean during slavery. This chapter shows that T&T is part of a global system, with
respect to the drug trade, and that inherent to this global pattern of trafficking, there exists a path
dependence based on its colonial history.
In Chapter 5, "T&T Government's response", I return to T&T and look at the various
policies and actions that the government has taken to respond to the rise in crime. Some of these
include hiring a foreign commissioner of police and declaring a national state of emergency both
within the past decade. I argue that the need for system dynamics modeling is great due to the
help it proffers to policymakers to determine which interventions may have the strongest impact
and how much time they need to wait to see results.
In Chapter 6, "Public Perception of the Government's Response", I highlight some of the
perceptions that the society holds of the law enforcement institutions because of the rise in crime
and alleged corruption due to the drug trade based on information found in newspaper articles
and reports.
In Chapter 7, "Analysis of System Dynamic Models of Crime", I evaluate system
dynamics models that look at pertinent crime and extract findings and recommendations that
apply to T&T.
In Chapter 8, "Conclusion", I discuss how system dynamics could be applied to T&T, I
briefly analyze the role of stakeholders in bringing about change in T&T, and I use
organizational theory to make some planning recommendations for the TTPS.
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Figure 1: Thesis Outline
Conclusion with
Planning Suggestions
for the TTPS
- Chapter 8
Methodology
For this thesis, I looked at newspaper articles, international and national data sets and
literature written about T&T and the Caribbean, the cocaine trade, crime, West Africa and
systems analysis, particularly system dynamics modeling.
The goal of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of how systems thinking could
guide policymakers who want to reduce crime and the negative impact of the transnational drug
trade in T&T. Through systems analysis and evaluating models that depict various interactions
between the drug traders, law enforcement and the community, I show that recommendations can
come from this long-range type of analysis. Although, defense-in-depth, where many methods
are employed at once, is needed, I hope to highlight some strategies that may be more effective.
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Chapter 2: The Drug Trade and Crime in Trinidad and Tobago
In this chapter, I profile the crime Figure 2: Homicide Rate in T&T
situation in T&T through statistics and
Homicide Rate in T&T per 100,000 people
newspaper articles. To begin with, crime
increased in T&T in the 2000s; in fact, the _ 40
0
homicide rate, which is used as a proxy for . 30
violent crime because its numbers are the
0 20
most credible, quadrupled from 2000 to
.10
2008, from 9 people per 100,000 (120 .v
people), to 41 people per 100,000 (547 0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
people). See Figure 2. In 2010, with 506 Source: UNODC Homicide dataset.
murders, the homicide rate was 35 people per 100,000, which placed T&T in the 90 'h percentile
or the top 10% of murders in the world (UNODC homicide dataset). These glaring statistics
denote that crime is indeed a major problem in T&T and indicates that there was a tipping point
whereby the factors cumulated to lead up to this drastic increase in violent crime. I posit that the
level of crime and the societal response to crackdowns on smuggling could be influenced by
political, institutional and cultural factors.
1) Africans were brought to T&T by European plantation owners as slaves as part of the
global economic policy from the days of slavery, later Indians come albeit as indentured laborers
and the Syrians also migrated to T&T as traders. These methods of entry established power
dynamics that still exists today. (Braithwaite 1953)
2) Following Independence in 1962, the black Trinidadians worked in the public service,
but the IMFs Structured Adjustment Program (SAPs) in the 1980s encouraged developing
countries to reduce the size of government, which cause many to lose their jobs. These SAPs,
which were supposed to increase the profitability of nations, resulted in increased poverty and
despair within some of the Afro-Trinidadian communities; as well as widened the inequality
gaps in the country. (Klein 2001)
3) With the rapid growth of the drug trade in T&T, the government hanged a major drug
dealer who controlled much of the cocaine transshipment in order to reduce crime; however, this
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hanging lead to increased gang warfare, crimes and kidnapping in the country. (Figueira 2004,
Prentice 2012)
4) The Colombian/Mexican power struggle and the "War on drugs" helped re-institute
T&T and the Caribbean as important nodes along the drug trade, which underlies much of the
transshipment dynamics in T&T, more in chapter 4. (UNODC 2011)
5) Additionally, in his Small Arms Survey report, "No Other Life: Gangs, Guns, and
Governance in Trinidad and Tobago", Townsend (2009) discusses government corruption and its
relationship to gangs and crime, although I think that this issue is pertinent, it is outside the scope
of this thesis.
Next, I look at crime statistics for the country.
Methodology
To establish the nature of crime in the T&T, I gather data from four major sources: the
UNODC, Police Statistics released by the T&T Central Statistical Office, newspaper articles and
literature review.
- The UNODC has various reports profiling crime in T&T and provides statistics on
homicides, drug seizures, and kidnappings
- The T&T Central Statistical Office (TT CSO) has provided national data7, which
summarizes the reported crimes by type of crime from 1998 to 2009. The data is
categorized as serious crimes, minor crime and minor offences. Additionally, the number of
convictions, for each of the same categories, is provided from 1999-2009
- The newspaper articles provide detailed information on the crime situation in T&T.
o To analyze the recent trends in drug seizures, I conducted an online search of the
three major T&T newspapers8 for the word "cocaine" and I collected information
7 These statistics were released over two reports: Report on Crime Statistics 2008, Central Statistical Office (CSO),
Ministry of Planning, Economic & Social Restructuring & Gender Affairs, Republic of T&T and Report on Crime
Statistics 2009, CSO, Ministry of Planning, Economic & Social Restructuring & Gender Affairs, Republic of T&T.
8 T&T Express, T&T Newsday and T&T Guardian
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from 40 articles, from 2010, with "seizures" mentioned in the article and created an
Microsoft Excel database.
o To do in-depth analysis of the murders in T&T, I created a dataset of 205 murders
based on 103 articles from the three top T&T newspapers. At each newspaper's
online site, I did a search for "murder" and read the most relevant articles that the
search returned. Newsday returned 30 articles, of which I read 9, Express returned
4,650 articles of which I read 29 and the Guardian returned 100 articles of which I
read 64.
- The literature review helps to set the stage and to provide an understanding for some of the
observed crime patterns.
Finally, I draw from my personal experience of living in T&T for 19 years in the 1980s
and 1990s as well as from conversations that I had with people living in some of the more
notorious regions in the country. For the sake of their safety, I did not interview them officially,
nor do I directly quote what they have said; instead, I use their stories to understand the situation
in T&T better.
Nature of Crime
Total Serious Crimes
The Central Statistical Office of
T&T released crime statistics for 1998 to
2009, with data divided into serious
crimes, minor crimes and minor offences.
Figure 3 highlights that the serious crimes
in T&T grew continuously from 2004, at
16,388 acts, to 2009, at 22,161 acts (TT
CSO 2008, 2009). Serious crimes could
be further split into 1) crimes against
persons, 2) crimes against property, 3)
Figure 3: Total Serious Crimes
I - Total Serious Crimes in T&T
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Source: TI Central Statistical Office 2008, 2009.
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narcotic offences, 4) forgery and crimes against currency, and 5) other. For this quantitative
description of the crime in T&T, I focus on the first three categories.
Figure 4: % Convictions for Total Serious Crimes
% Total Serious Crimes Convictions in T&T
16,261 acts; 1,629 conv's
22,161 acts; 550 conv's
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Source: TT Central Statistical Office 2009.
Additionally, the CSO provides
information on the number of
convictions from 1999-2009. From this
data, the percent of convictions, has
decreased from about 10%, in 1999 to
just over 2% in 2009. For the decade on
average 5% of the serious crimes
reported resulted in conviction. This
indicates that not only are more 'serious
crimes' being committed, but the
judicial system is less able to convict the
perpetrators (TT CSO 2009).
Crimes against Persons
'Murders', 'manslaughters',
'felonious wounding', and 'other' make-
up the crimes against persons category.
Manslaughter, which according to
Dictionary.com is the crime of killing
another human without malice
aforethought9 , decreased over the ten-year
period; however, murders and wounding
grew steadily. Felonious wounding
peaked in 2003, with 784 acts of violence,
dropped in 2004, by about 150 acts and
Figure 5: Crimes against Persons
Crimes Against Persons in T&T, excl. Other
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Source: TT Central Statistical Office 2008, 2009.
9http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/manslaughter
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then rebounded in 2005 to the highest in the decade of 801 acts as shown in Figure 5. Both
murders and felonious wounding dropped off in 2009. (TT CSO 2008, 2009)
Figure 6: % Convictions for Crimes against Persons
% Convictions for Crimes Against Persons in
T&T, excl. Other
s.0% -
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
- Murder Convictions
- Manslaughter Convictions
- Wounding (felonious) Convictions
Source: TT Central Statistical Office 2009.
As with total serious crimes, the
conviction rates dropped for crimes
against persons. On average for the
decade, less than 1% of the murder
charges resulted in conviction, about 2%
of the manslaughter charges and about 3%
of the felonious wounding charges. The
numbers show that the judicial system is
inadequate at finding and convicting
perpetrators of violent crimes (TT CSO
2009).
Crimes against Property
Crimes against property increased
52% from 12,510 acts in 1998 to 19,069
acts in 2009. Breaking & burglary
account for about 35% of the crimes
against property, robbery, 31%, larceny,
29%, and other, 5% of the crimes over the
decade. This shows that not only have
violent crimes increased in T&T over the
2000s, but other serious crimes have
increased in the nation as well. (TT CSO
2008, 2009)
Figure 7: Crimes against Property
I Crimes Against Property in T&T
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Source: TT Central Statistical Office 2008, 2009.
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Conversely, Breaking & Burglary
generally decreased over this period,
whereas robbery and larceny increased.
Figure 8: Crimes against Property excl. Other[ Crimes Against Property in T&T, excl. Other
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Source: TT Central Statistical Office 2008, 2009.
Figure 9: % Convictions for Crimes against Property[ % Convictions for Crimes Against Property in
T&T, excl. Other
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Convictions for crimes against
property show the same pattern as the
other serious crimes with the rate
decreasing over the decade.
Narcotics Offenses
Unlike crimes against persons and
crimes against property that dipped in
2004, narcotic offences peaked in that
year. In 2000, the lowest point in the
decade narcotic offences were just over
4,000 acts and it grew 65% to over 6,700
in 2004. Total narcotic offences dropped
in 2009 by almost 2,000 acts, which
Figure 10: Major & Minor Narcotic Offences
Major and Minor Narcotic Offences in T&T
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Source: TT Central Statistical Office 2008, 2009.
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indicates that either less people were
involved with the narcotics trade or the
police caught less people doing it. (TT
CSO 2008, 2009)
Minor narcoticslo offences are on
average six times more than major
narcotics offences. Although minor
narcotic offences grew until 2004 and then
dropped, major narcotic offences dropped
in 2001 and stayed under 1,000 acts for the
Figure 12: Major & Minor Narcotic Offences
Major and Minor Narcotic Offences in T&T
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Source: TT Central Statistical Office 2008, 2009.
Figure 11: % Convictions for Narcotic Offences
resulted in convictions (TT CSO 2009).
Authorities seized over 4,000 kg of
cocaine since 2004 in T&T, according to
the UNODC Seizures database, with the
highest seizure occurring in 2005. The
lower seizures from 2007 and onwards
may be the result of better strategies by
drug dealers to avoid capture by law
enforcement (UNODC WDR 2011,
Figui
rest of the decade. This implies that T&T
either has many small actors and/or major
players who are not caught (TT CSO
2008, 2009).
The conviction rate for the narcotic
offences is much higher than the rates for
the serious crimes. Over the past decade,
on average 61% of the minor narcotic
offences and 28% of the major ones have
e 13: Cocaine Seizures
Cocaine (base and salts) Seizures in kg, in T&T
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Source: UNODC WDR 2011, Seizures dataset.
10 The data did not state the distinction between major and minor narcotic offences.
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% Convictions for Major and Minor Narcotic
Offences in T&T
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Source: TT Central Statistical Office, 2009.
Seizures dataset). Conversely, it could be due to drug traders no longer using T&T as a
transshipment point because of the major interdictions in 2005 and 2006.
Minor Crimes & Offences and Non-Narcotic Crimes
Finally, minor crimes and m
offencesi', in general have decreased over
timed period with minor offences having a sl
uptick in 2009.
Figure 14: % Convictions for Minor Crimes & Offences
% Convictions for Total Minor Crimes
and Total Minor Offences in T&T
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Similarly, non-narcotic crimes decreased
in over the decade with a slight increase in 2009.
Figure 17: % Convictions for Non-Narcotic Crimes
% Convictions for Total Non-Narcotic
Crimes in T&T
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Figure 15: Total Minor Crimes & Offences
Total Minor Crimes and Total Minor
Offences in T&T
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The conviction rate of minor crimes has
averaged around 25% for the decade and the
conviction rate for minor offences around I1%
(TT CSO 2009).
Fiigure 16: Total Non -Narcotic Crimes
Total Non-Narcotic Crimes in T&T
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Source: TT Central Statistical Office 2008, 2009.
Additionally the percent of convictions,
ch averaged around 8%, decreased as well (TT
) 2009).
w
CS(
"The data did not have notes explaining the difference in minor crimes, minor offences and serious crimes.
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Kidnappings
Kidnappings during the 2000s
were a national epidemic that also took on
a racial lens. Allegedly, after the Dole
Chadee and his gang were hanged in the
1990s, there were turf wars and
kidnappings as rivaling gangs tried to gain
control of his piece of the business
(Figueira 2004). Starting with the taking of
Anthony Sabga, teenage son of one of the
local Syrian families, in 2002 (Prentice
2012), kidnappings became a way for
Figure 18: Kidnappings
I Count of Kidnappings in T&T
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people to gain money from the local businesspersons, many of whom were Indian merchants
(Figueira 2004). Additionally, many of the money drops occurred in Laventille, a poor black
area in the country, so the slanderous perception that the envious black community members
were kidnapping the prosperous Indian people promulgated. According to the UNODC
Kidnapping Dataset, in 2005 T&T was in the 88th percentile of kidnappings, of the 84 countries
with data, with 4.4 persons per 100,000. Although, T&T had a lower rate of kidnappings than
Kuwait or Occupied Palestine, it had a higher rate than Colombia or Peru. (UNODC kidnapping
dataset, Figueira 2004, Prentice 2012, Temple Raston 200712). The kidnappings increased the
tension and fear in the country.
Conversely, after the surge in 2005, kidnappings decreased from 2006 onwards. These
results may be the result of successful police intervention and policy in reducing the number of
kidnappings. These feedback relationships could be important in determining the ripple effects
of public safety measures and this suggests that a system dynamics approach toward modeling
the criminal justice system could be useful. Figure 19 below uses system dynamics notation to
diagram the feedback relationships.
12 Temple Raston, Dina, "Police Tackle Kidnapping Surge in Trinidad", NPR, August 17, 2007.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 12649870
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Figure 19: Kidnapping Intervention Loop
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Crime Statistics Correlation
Using statistical analysis, I examine some of these relationships. For most of the factors,
I have at 11 years of data13 , from which I calculated the Pearson Correlation Coefficient, r, to
determine whether there is correlation among the factors. Pearson correlation returns a value
from -1 to +1, where negative numbers indicate negative correlation; conversely, positive
numbers indicate positive correlation. The closer than r is to -I or +1, the more correlated the
two datasets are. Additionally, because the number of terms are 11 for most of the variables, I
14
consider r >= 0.55 and r <= -0.55 to indicate significant correlation . Table 1 below shows the
Pearson Correlation Coefficient with no lagging of the years to show the general relationships.
Future analysis would include doing this analysis several times with various time lags to
understand to gain a better understanding of the relationships. The data for this table are the same
as mentioned above.
13 For Kidnappings and Vol of Cocaine Seized, I only have 6 years of data.
14 For an N of 10, correlation must be as high as 0.55 to be significant at 0.05, and for an N of 5, correlation must be
as high as 0.80 to be significant at 0.05. (Rummel, R.J., "Understanding Correlation" Honolulu: Department of
Political Science University of Hawaii, 1976, Chapter 9.3: Statistical versus Practical Significance)
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-Successful
Kidnapping
Table 1: Pearson Correlation Coefficient, no time lag
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This simple correlation matrix suggests that homicide, which is used as the measure of
violent crime, is negatively correlated with total crime, minor crimes & offences and total non-
narcotic crimes. Major and minor narcotic crimes are positively correlated homicides and
felonious woundings. Additionally, the number of kidnappings and the volume of cocaine seized
are positively correlated.
Analysis of Crimes from Newspaper Articles
The following data comes from a sample of 40 articles where the word "seizures" was
mentioned when I searched the online T&T newspapers for the word "cocaine" and all of the
seizures occurred in T&T. Of the seizures, 22 occurred in 2010, 14 in 2011 and 4 in 2012. These
40 seizures summed to 308 kg of cocaine, worth about USD $18.7 million and 60 people were
implicated in the events. The following diagrams summarize the results.
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Figure 20: Seizures Summary
Found in Local Hiding Spot
- seized mainly from homes and cars
- found with guns and money
of seizures
I
I
I
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I Cocaine hidden in luggage
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Other Ports
ICocaine hidden on person
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Most of seizures were made because of TTPS, and particularly the Organised Crime,
Firearms and Narcotics Bureau (OCFNB), searches based either on tips or on observations of
suspicious activity.
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Figure 21: Map of the Nationality of People found with cocaine (color) and their intended location
(arrows) in T&T
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Youth/Gang Violence
Drug lords use their connections in T&T to recruit young males and equip them with
weapons to protect and move the drugs as necessary. Allegedly, powerful and wealthy people
are bringing guns into the poor areas, such as Laventille, and giving them to the youth in the
community (Figueira 2004, Prentice 2012). Unfortunately, although most of the drugs move out
of the country, the weapons remain in the hands of the young male gangs members; this results
in an underground economy where people rent guns out for others to commit crimes and get
reimbursed based on the expected pay-out of the crime (UNODC 2007). Gang violence has
increased and certain areas have become crime hotspots, these areas include Chaguanas, Couva,
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La Horquetta, Arima and Diego Martin. Other areas such as Port-of-Spain, Morvant and
Laventille have long been identified as areas with a high prevalence of crime'
Repercussions of the increased number of gangs include increased violence, evidenced by
the increases in felonious wounding and murders, and a decreasing sense of safety in the
communities. Recently, a student was found with a .38 revolver at his school ,16 which raised
alarms because schools are usually considered safe zones even in the most violent areas
(Townsend 2009). This ease in access to guns has worsened the quality of life in T&T. News
reports indicate that gang violence is the leading cause for murders in the country.17
Homicides
To analyze the homicide data in detail, I built a dataset of 205 murders based on 103
newspaper articles. A profile of the data Figure 22: Homicide Victims by Age
indicates that most of the victims were Age Range of Homicide Victims in the Dataset
young males who were shot; in fact, of the
60 -
205 incidents, 87% of the victims were
50 -
male and 43% of the victims were under 40 -
29 years old. Figure 22 highlights that 30 -
most of the victims were in the 20-29 age 20 -
group, which represents 36% of the 10 -
dataset. As a single age group, 35 year 0
01-09 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89
olds and 23 year olds were the most killed Source: Author created database from newspaper articles.
people with 10 murder victims at each of those ages.
" Bagoo, Andre, "We Will Win War", T&T Newsday, September 14, 2011.
http://www.newsday.co.tt/news/0,147199.html
16 T&T Guardian, "Student held with gun in school", T&T Guardian, February 4, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/02/04/student-held-gun-school
17 Renne, Denyse, "Murder figure rising", T&T Express, February 7, 2011.
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/Murder figure rising-115455869.html
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Figure 23: Method of Murder Hollywood-mafia-styled killings
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N Strangled some people were killed. Oftentimes,
m Suffocated people were shot when talking to
w Drowned neighbors just outside their homes. In
a Thrown off home general, shootings were the most popularbalcony
method of murder with 71% of the people
n Explosion
Source: Author created database from newspaper articles. (140) being killed in this way. Stabbing
slightly edged out chopping (with a machete) as the second most popular method of killings,
with 16 and 15 deaths respectively. A few people were beaten, strangled, and suffocated as
summarized in Figure 23.
Not all of the articles mentioned a
cause of death, but of the 112 that did,
gang-related or drug-related violence
account for 57% of the motives. 9% of the
murders involved the killing of law
enforcement officials and their family,
including the murder of police officers,
soldiers and police informants. In one
case, the sister of the Director of Public
Prosecutions was thrown over the balcony
of her house. Figure 24 shows the
Figure 24: Motive of Murder
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Source: Author created database from newspaper articles.
breakdown of the motives.
The murders occurred in over 70 different locations, but the top 5 locations: Laventille,
Arima, Diego Martin, Morvant and Port-of-Spain account for 41% of where the murders took
place. These are all urban areas including or with the periphery of Port-of-Spain, the capital and
Arima, one of the major towns.
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Racial Crime Perceptions
According the CIA World Figure 25: Ethnic Groups in T&T
Factbook, T&T's population is 40% Ethnic Groups in T&T
people of [East] Indian descent (Indians), 1 1*
38% people of African descent (Africans),
0 Indian (South Asian)
21% mixed races and 2% people of other UAfrican
ethnicities or people who are undefined. fMixed
mOther
These other groups include people of E Unspecified
Syrian and Lebanese descent (Syrians),
people of Chinese descent (Chinese), and
Source: CIA World Factbook, 2012, based on 2000 TT Census..
people of European descent, including the
British, French, Portuguese, and Spanish (Caucasians); all of whom have been living on the
islands in relative peace for the past few centuries.
The Arawaks and Caribs were the first known settlers in the country as indigenous
migrants from the South American mainland, many died when the Spanish and French came in
the late 1400s and most of the survivors were interbred into the European and African
populations. These first Europeans brought over the Africans to cultivate the land as slaves. The
British took over in 1797 and during their tenure slavery ended, so they brought in indentured
laborers from India who they paid minimally to work the land. The Syrians and the Chinese
came to Trinidad as merchants and traders in the late 1800s, early 1900s; they became involved
in retail and as a result, they own many of the major stores in the country. (Braithwaite 1953)
In 1962, the black elite rose up and claimed our Independence from the British Empire
with the People's National Movement (PNM). Allegedly, the Syrians and other members of the
elite classes funded the PNM and its rise to power (Figueira 2004). After Independence, many
people of African descent got jobs in the public service, as they did not own land and these jobs
gave them good economic opportunities, whereas many of those of Indian descent decided to
continue working the lands awarded to them in payment of their indentureship. With
emancipation and rejection of plantation servitude, many of the African people moved to the
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hills and valleys just outside the nation's capital, Port-Of-Spain, in Laventille, Morvant, Belmont
and Diego Martin (Griffith 2011, Townsend 2009, Figueira 2004).
In the 1980s, when the IMF purported the Structured Adjustment Programs (SAPs),
which encouraged governments to decrease in size, some of the people in the African
communities lost their jobs, lost their faith in the government and started to despair.
Coincidentally, the price of oil dropped, so T&T, which has an oil-based economy, tail-spun into
a recession. Allegedly, this is when the drug trade started taking its hold in T&T, as the wealthy
drug lords preyed upon the poor people in the black urban communities, for example
Morvant/Laventille, and got them to be foot soldiers in the trade. (Griffith 1996, Klein 2001,
Figueira 2004, Prentice 2012).
Over the years, some of the Indians who moved away from agriculture went into retail
and became direct competitors with the Syrians. Shopping centers moved away from Port of
Spain, which was a Syrian foothold, to other parts of the county, particularly in the South, which
have more Indian patronage. These wealthy Indians led to the rise of the other major political
party in T&T the United National Congress (UNC). Additionally, these wealthy Indians also
became involved in the drug trade, for example: Dole Chadee who was one of the more
notorious drug dealers from T&T was of Indian descent (Prentice 2012, Figueira 2004).
The rise in crime has been blamed on the African communities in T&T, but some posit
that the young black boys are just pawns in the game being played by wealthier set with the
resources to formulate strategy (Figueira 2004, Prentice 2012).
The racial stereotypes in T&T include that:
- The people of African descent are the drug runners, kidnappers and urban gang members
(Griffith 2011)
- The wealthy people of Indian descent are involved in the drug transshipment, and the poorer
Indians are part of rural gangs involved in drug and gun running and kidnapping (Townsend
2009)
- The wealthy people of Syrians/Lebanese descent are the legacy players in the transshipment
of cocaine (Figueira 2004, Townsend 2009)
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- The Chinese mafia infiltrating because of the recent influx of Chinese nationals' 8
Crime Against Immigrants
The recent years have seen an influx of Chinese immigrants who have come to work in
construction or trade, these immigrants are falling victim to the crime in the country. The
Chinese Embassy believes that there is deliberate targeting of Chinese nationals' 9 by local
criminals. Consequently, they have asked the Minister of National Security to provide them with
protection in order to continue doing business in the country, after a Chinese businessman was
shot, 20. Michael Lee Kim, president of the Sun Wai Association said, "crime is affecting the
economy because people are reluctant to invest" and he added that there is increased fear21 in the
Chinese community. Conversely, police statistics do not verify that Chinese people are being
targeted according to Sgt Wayne Mystar, spokesman for the Police Service. 22
Deportees and Crime
Allegedly, one of the sources of
crime in the country is deportees who have
been sent back to the country from the US
because of illegal activity. Some of the
deportees are young men, whose parents
took them to the US when they were
children, but they never got citizenship
Figure 26: US Deportees to T&T
Deportees to T&T from the US
400
300
200
100
El. I I
-- ----- II
~IhIIIII
111111 1
0
1998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010
a Criminal m Non-Criminal
Source: US Homeland Security, various.
18 T&T Guardian, "Chinese Triad Expands in T&T", T&T Guardian, May 18, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/05/17/chinese-triad-expands-tt
19 T&T Newsday, "Deliver the Killers", T&T Newsday, July 17, 2012.
http://www.newsday.co.tt/editorial/0,163437.html
20 Renne, Denyse, "Chinese community to get protection", T&T Newsday, July 16, 2012.
http://www.newsday.co.tt/news/0,163376.html
21 Pickford-Gordon, "Chinese Demand Justice", T&T Newsday, July 17, 2012.
http://www.newsday.co.tt/crime and court/0.163469.html
22 T&T Newsday, "Mystar: Chinese not targets of criminals", July 18, 2012.
http://www.newsday.co.tt/crime and court/0,163473.html
39
there, so, when they commit a crime the US government sends them back to T&T. However,
many of these young men no longer have family ties in T&T so they get involved in crime and
some actually link the criminal networks in T&T to their networks in the US (Griffith 1996).
Since 1998, 4,218 people were deported to T&T from the US and 2,433 of them were deported
for criminal reasons2 3, see Figure 26 (US Homeland Security 2011).
Drug Trade and Terrorism in T&T
Brigadier Sandy, the head of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), warns that, "T&T
is a soft target for terrorists." 24 He posits that through money laundering and other financial
schemes terrorists are able to clean their money in T&T. Additionally, Independent Senator
Balgobin worries that terrorism money is flowing through T&T. He said, "Terrorism is real,
very real, especially for small countries." He added that it was "quite easy to bring something
into Tobago and just put it on the ferry and bring it across, and guess what, that happens."
Conclusion
This chapter summarizes some of the crime statistics in T&T and shows that although the
total crime in the country is decreasing the homicides, felonious wounding and serious crimes
are increasing. Additionally, the narcotic offences are increasing in general although the number
of serious narcotic crimes remains steady and the number of minor narcotic offences grows. A
systems approach would be useful in identifying feedback mechanisms and relationships that
may cause one type of crime to grow, but another type to decrease.
23 2001 - 2010 come from Table 38 of the 2011 report, 2000 from Table 8 of the 2010 report, 1999 from Table 37 of
the 2009 report and 1998 Table 37 of the 2008 report.
24 T&T Guardian, "Sandy: T&T a soft target for terrorists", T&T Guardian, April 27. 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/201 1/04/27/sandy-tt-soft-target-terrorists
25 T&T Guardian, "Senator: Where's the money coming from?", T&T Guardian, June 24, 2012.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/04/27/senator-where-s-money-coming
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Chapter 3: Cocaine and the Caribbean
The challenge of increased crime due to the drug trade is not specific to T&T and is
indeed a problem that is faced throughout the Caribbean. In this chapter, I summarize the crime
and drug trade conditions for the sovereign nation islands of the Caribbean and then I consider
the likelihood of the countries becoming narco-transshipment states.
The Drug problem in the Caribbean
Drug production, consumption and abuse, trafficking and money laundering are the major
direct problems of the drug trade in the Caribbean, with increased crime, and more homicides as
spillover effects. Cocaine, heroin and marijuana are the major illegal drugs abused in the region,
with heroin considered an upper class drug, cocaine a middle lower class drug and marijuana a
working class drug. (Griffith 1996, Klein 200 1)
The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) in their 2011 Annual Report 2011 said
that in the Caribbean and Central American cocaine abuse is above the world average. 26
However, this chapter is limited to the transshipment of cocaine in the Caribbean.
Geographic Reasons for Caribbean Participation in the Drug Trade
The Caribbean is located between cocaine producers and consumers; as a result, illegal
drug trafficking is one of the primary causes of crime in the region. In addition to its geo-
strategic location between the cocaine producers in South America and the major cocaine
markets in the USA and Europe, many Caribbean islands have poorly guarded seashores that
make them ideal for use by drug traffickers. Consequently, tonnes of cocaine pass through the
Caribbean on an annual basis (UNODC 2011, UNODC 2007). Illegal drug traffickers need
people at various points along the supply chain to help them move their goods, so they bribe
officials to turn a blind eye, and they hire enforcers, who they supply with weapons, to guard the
26 T&T Guardian, "Annual report reveals: Cocaine abuse above world average in Caribbean region" T&T Guardian,
February 29, 2012. ht:I/www.guardian.co.tt/news/2012-02-29/annual-report-reveals-cocaine-abuse-above-world-
average-caribbean-region
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shipments. Moreover, drug traffickers often pay the people whom they employ with product; as
a result, these people become drug dealers in their own countries in order to make money
(UNODC 2007).
The northern islands of Jamaica and the Dominican Republic used to be the largest ports
for transshipment in the Caribbean due to their long seashores and the nearness to the US;
however, as international law enforcement interdictions reduced profit and opportunities arose in
other countries, such as T&T, the routes shifted (Griffith 1996).
Additionally, the Mexican cartels took over the trade from the Colombians, the cocaine
moved up the Central American coastline to get into the US instead of going through Caribbean,
which was the Colombians preferred route. However, US immigration at the Mexican borders
began cracking down on the trade thereby greatly reducing the profitability at the same time that
the Colombians were actively expanding the trade in the Europe. Consequently, the cocaine
routes moved back to the Caribbean both as a means to get to the US, but also to get into Europe.
From the trade relationships and vacationing patterns established by the Europeans post
Colonialism, trade ships and cruise liners frequently came from Europe to the Caribbean, which
increased the attractiveness for the drug trade (Klein 2001, Griffith 1996, UNODC 2011).
Figure 27: How interdictions may have helped the cocaine trade through the Caribbean
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The flow chart above shows policy resistance, which is when the interventions that were
created to improve a problem may trigger responses that push back and actually exacerbate the
problem. In this case, the interdictions, which were meant to stymie the drug trade in the
Caribbean as drugs flowed to the US, may have eventually led to a growth of the trade as the
drugs flow to Europe.
Economic/Political Reasons for Participation in the Drug Trade
The drug trade in the Caribbean accelerated during the 80s and 90s, partly because of the
worsening economic conditions in the Caribbean coming from the International Monetary
Fund's (IMF) Structural Adjust Programs (SAPs). As Klein (2001) points out, these programs
reduced the faith the country had in the government, because they called for the reduction in the
public service sector. Many people lost their jobs, the economy was bad and they had to find
alternative sources of revenue; in fact, Klein proposes that the drug trade was the most profitable
sector coming out of the Caribbean in the 1980s. Additionally, the SAPs increased inequality
and social tension in the Caribbean, causing the gap between the legal and social definitions of
crime to increase and poor areas like Laventille, in T&T, and Tivoli Gardens, in Jamaica, to
suffer (Klein 2001).
During the Cold War, the US monitored the conditions in the Caribbean for fear that the
countries would adopt communist ideology; however, once it was over the US moved resources
to the Middle East, leaving the Caribbean vulnerable to the wealthy operators in the drug trade
(Klein 2001). Concurrently, with North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries
lost their preferential trade relationships with Europe. Many Caribbean isles had long traded
agricultural products like bananas and sugar cane with European countries; so, the opening of the
market negatively affected them, as Caribbean countries were unable to match the prices that
bigger countries with larger production could offer. These factors all contributed to the growth
of the cocaine trade in the region (UNODC 2011, Klein 2001).
Current poor economic conditions and difficulty in finding jobs contribute to reasons that
people get involved with crime and the drug trade (Klein 2001, Prentice 2012). Unemployment
over the last five years has been about 14% in the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic and St.
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Lucia (WB indicators). The drug trade provides a viable alternative to people who are unable to
find employment in the licit economy.
Finally, in the 80s and 90s when the trade was growing, the law enforcement could not
match the resources of the cocaine shippers. In 1987, the heads of state of CARICOM developed
a regional program to control drug trafficking (Klein 2001). Figure 28 below summarizes this
information by showing some of the key causal loops.
Figure 28: Economic Policy Leading to the Growth of the Drug Trade in the Caribbean
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The Supply Chain of Cocaine
Price and Volume
Table 2: Price of Cocaine Salt in Various Countries
Country
Price
(USD $)
/ gram Year
Producers --I
Bolivia 4.0 2008
Colombia 3.5 2008
Peru 4.5 2006
Transshipment - Caribbean
Bahamas 20.0 2005 1
Barbados 27.2 2007
Cuba 64.8 2009
Dominica 60.0 2004
Dominican
Republic
Grenada
7.0 2009
1 44.3 1 2005 1
Haiti 12.0 2004
St. Lucia 11.2 2004
St. Vincent 3.7 2008
Trinidad
69 a
Price
(USD $)
Country I /gram
Primarv Consumers
Finland 208.6
Year
2009
France 97.3 2009
Germany 156.0 2009
Greece 139.1 2009
Italy 116.5 2009
Norway 176.5 2008
Spain 82.9 2009
Sweden 155.9 2009
UK 107.7 2009
USA 413.0 2009
In general, cocaine prices
increase drastically as the drugs
move north. In the production
countries of Bolivia, Colombia and
Peru, drugs sold at under USD $5 a
gram. In the transshipment
countries, where data is provided,
cocaine sold for up to USD $65 in
Cuba, with T&T and Dominica
having similar prices. However, in
the main consumption countries of
Europe and USA, prices went up to
I a o _ ago _I . I
Source: UNODC WDR 2011, Cocaine Prices dataset: USD $209 and USD $413,
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/WDR201 1/WDR Final Prices crop.pdf respectively. In Venezuela, a
South American cocaine transshipment country, the price of cocaine went up to USD $12 and in
Nigeria, a South American transshipment countries, cocaine sold for up to USD $ 41.
Additionally, in 2009, an estimated 41% and 29% of the cocaine in tonnes were consumed in
North America and Europe, respectively. These numbers confirm that the major markets for
cocaine do not lie in the transshipment countries but in the US and Europe as both price and
volume are high (UNODC WDR 2011 Cocaine Prices datatset, UNODC 2011 Tables 1-4).
Modes of Shipment
Traffickers use various methods to get the drugs into the US and Europe including:
- Human beings - People are paid to hide drugs and travel to the targeted country. In November
2011, a Venezuelan woman was charged for trafficking drugs in T&T when drug-sniffing
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Producers
d T b1 2006
dogs smelt the 49 pellets of cocaine that she had stuffed into her undergarments. Under
observations, she excreted 57 more pellets of cocaine that she had ingested earlier. The 52-
year old mother of three was discovered when Customs checked, the Sea Prowler, a ship
leaving T&T in Chaguaramas27 . Earlier in the year, a woman was arrested in Princes Town
T&T after she complained about feeling unwell and 500 grammes of cocaine were found in
her stomach and inserted into her genitals.
- Cruise ships - Thousands of cruise ship passengers pass through the Caribbean, this makes
them targets for those trying to get their drug shipments north. Below are figures showing
cruise ship passengers and pleasure crafts arrivals in T&T.
Figure 29: Cruise Ships and Pleasure Crafts Arrivals in T&T
Table 1. Cruise Ship Calls and Cruise Passenger Arrivals 2006-2008
Data Source: Port Authority of Trinidad and Tobago
Source: Tourism Development Company Limited
Figure 1. Pleasure Craft Arrivals 2005- 2008
Foreign Yacht Arrivals to Trinidad and Tobago 2005-2008
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Source: Yacht Services Association of Trinidad and Tobago
Source: T&T Anti-Drug Plan 2008-2012, Table I & Figure 1
27 Ramdass, Rickie, "Charged for cocaine, Venezuelan remanded", T&T Express, November 23, 2011.
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/Charged for cocaine Venezuelan remanded-134438443.html
28 Kissoon, Carolyn, "Traffickers swallows cocaine, treated at Sando Hospital", T&T Express, February, 2011.
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/Trafficker swallows cocaine treated at Sando hospital- 115311069.html
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- Small boats - In March 2012, the Coast Guard seized about 1,600 kg of cocaine (3,532 lbs),
worth about USD $43 million, in a speedboat coming from the Caribbean off the coast of
Miami USA. Four people from the Caribbean were arrested for drug trafficking29
- Submersibles - In August 2011, about 6,800 kg of cocaine (15,000 lbs), worth about USD
$180 million, were seized in a 'drug sub' entering the Miami waters from the Caribbean.
- Airplanes
- Cargo/freight ships
The Spillover Effects of the Cocaine Trade
Murder Rates increasing
Drug traffickers usually hire local people and provide them with weapons to guard over
the goods; as a result, large amounts of guns are smuggled into Caribbean countries.
Additionally, young males are lured into the drug trade because of the money, the power and the
sense of belonging that it gives them, these boys become armed and deadly. Consequently, the
murder rate has increased. In Dominica, the homicide rate per 100,000 people went from 1 in
2001 to 22 in 2010; in St. Kitts and Nevis, the rate went from 7 in 2000 to 52 in 2009; and in
T&T, the rate went from 9 in 2000 to 41 in 2008. Up to 71% of the murders, in T&T, were
committed with firearms in 2005 (UNODC Homicide dataset 2012, UNODC 2007). These
armed young males are also forming allegiances and creating gangs; consequently, gang-related
violence is believed to be the cause of much of the violence perpetrated against young people
(Wilks 2007).
The people in the Caribbean have debated the role of deportees in the drug trade and the
increase in crime. Since 2001, the US has deported over 72,000 people back to the Caribbean
62% of which were deported for criminal reasons (Homeland Security 2011). Some posit that
29 Rosenberg, Carol, "Coast Guard discloses nearly two-ton Caribbean coke bust", The Miami Herald, March 2012.
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/03/13/2691262/coast-guard-discloses-nearly-two.html
'0 CBS Miami, "$180M In "Drug Sub" Cocaine Offloaded in Miami", CBS News - Miami, August 2011.
http://miami.cbslocal.com/tag/caribbean-drug-seizure/
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the criminal deportees may be strengthening links between the US gangs and the Caribbean
gangs as well as bringing US-styled gang violence to the Caribbean (Griffith 1996).
Figure 30: Deportees to
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0
the Caribbean from the US
Deportees to Caribbean from the US
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
w Criminal U Non-Criminal
2007 2008 2009 2010
Source: US Homeland Security.
In addition to the links formed via deportees, the extensive Caribbean Diaspora provides
avenues that drug traffickers may try to exploit. Since colonial times, people from the Caribbean
have migrated to Europe, particularly the UK, for education and better opportunities. During the
recession in the 70s and 80s migration patterns shifted to include the US as a primary
destination. Not only do traffickers abuse these networks to get shipments into Europe and the
US, but they also create gangs in the new countries to help with the sale of the product (Griffith
1996).
Other forms of crime
Kidnapping, money laundering and corruption are other forms of organized crimes that
have been linked to the drug trade in the Caribbean (CARICOM 2002, Griffith 1996). In T&T
the kidnapping rate doubled from 1999 to 2005 and in Haiti in 2005, the kidnapping rate
quadrupled (UNODC 2007). Initially, some people in T&T believed that the kidnappings were
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between drug dealers, gangs, bodyguards and others involved in the drug trade (Figueira 2004,
Prentice 2012). However, because of the apparent success of first kidnappings, other wealthy
people were targeted; eventually, kidnappings became a national epidemic making anyone with
real or perceived wealth a target. The consequences of drug trafficking have worsened the crime
situation in the Caribbean.
Money laundering is another offshoot from the drug trade as participants need to get their
money into the legal system without arising much suspicion so drug money is filtered through
business endeavors.
Narco-Transshipment-State Analysis
Morrison (1997) created a metric to evaluate which states are at risk of becoming narco-
states for the production of drugs. This analysis does not directly apply to transshipment
countries; however, I tweak Morrison's factors to analyze the likelihood of countries in the
Caribbean being susceptible to becoming narco-transshipment-states.
A narco-state is defined "an area that has been taken over and is controlled and corrupted
by drug cartels and where law enforcement is effectively nonexistent"31 . Griffith (2011) calls it
a place where 1) "the top rulers of a country either collude with drug lords or so fear them that
they turn a blind eye to their pursuits (e.g. Afghanistan under Taliban rule)" or 2) "drug dealers
exercise effective control over parts of the nation, thereby undermining the nation's
governability by the rulers who reputedly govern it" (e.g. Colombia during 1960s-1990s). Like
Griffith, I do not think that any Caribbean country is currently a narco-state; however, I posit that
if the conditions continue to worsen and crime keeps rising, some countries may potentially
become as such. This analysis is to consider the likelihood of countries becoming narco-
transshipment-states.
The factors that Morrison identifies are:
- Corruption ranking
3 FreeDictionary.com; http://www.thefreedictionary.com/narco-state.
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- Armed Conflict/Insurgency
- Rural Economic Insecurity
- Economic Security
- Nature of Existing Industries to identify chemical industries
However, not all of these indicators are valid for transshipment routes. The Rural
Economic Security indicator is important to establish whether drug lords can gain a foothold in
the agriculture industry in the country to claim for the raw material production. Additionally, it
indicates which areas may be more likely to have officials turn a blind eye because the drug
production may create jobs and improve the economic condition of the people living there.
Finally, the number of chemical industries is less important for transshipment countries than they
are for countries where the drugs are produced.
To adjust Morrison's metrics to get the narco-transshipment risk, I use:
Figure 31: Narco-Transshipment-State Risk Factors
Additional Factors for Transshipment
Morrison's (1997) Factors, Adjusted Analysis
11 k__ _ _ _ _
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Corruption ranking:
The Transparency International devises an index to assess the perception of corruption on
a nation-wide level. Countries are ranked from 0 to 10, where a CPI of 0 indicates that there is a
high perception of corruption and a CPI of 10 indicates that the perception of corruption is low.
New Zealand with a score of 9.5 is perceived as the least corrupt country and Somalia and North
Korea, with score of 1.0 are considered the most corrupt countries with rankings of 182. For the
countries in the Caribbean where this index is calculates, in 2011, Barbados had the highest score
with 7.8, ranking as perceived the 16th least corrupt nation, and Haiti had the lowest score with
1.8, ranking as the perceived 175th least corrupt nation. Trinidad and Tobago has a score of 3.2,
ranking as the perceived 91st least corrupt nation. (Transparency Index Report, 2011) For my
analysis scores of 10-7 indicate low levels, 4-7 indicate medium levels and 0-4 indicate high
levels of perceived corruption. Using this metric, two countries, Bahamas and Barbados, have
low perceived corruption, four countries have medium levels of perceived corruption and four
countries, including Trinidad and Tobago have high levels of perceived corruption. The figure
below shows the Corruption Perception Index, score and rank, for the countries in the Caribbean.
Figure 32: 2011 Corruption Perception Index, from least corrupt to most corrupt
2011 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from least corrupt to most corrupt
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
16
21 24 25
- 44
- 61
- 86-
-NA NA NA
0
Number indicates World Rank out of 183 countries ranked; lower rank and higher score indicates little corruption.
Source: Transparency International 2011 Report. http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/
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Homicide rates:
Homicide rate data is more relevant for the Caribbean than Armed Conflict / Insurgency
as homicides in the Caribbean are tracked by national governments and are compiled by the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Using the 2010 world homicide rate,
Singapore has lowest rate of annual homicides at 0.37 persons per 10,000; conversely, Honduras
had the highest rate at 82.09 persons per 10,000. For this analysis, I use the 33rd percentile, of
the global homicide rate data (2 persons per 10,000) as the upper limit for the low rank and the
66th percentile (11 persons per 10,000) as the upper limit for the medium rank.
The Caribbean has medium to high homicide rates. Cuba and Haiti have two of the
lowest rates, and this may be due to errors in the reporting, with 5 persons and 7 persons per
10,000 murdered respectively. Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad and Tobago all have
homicide rates in the 9 0 th percentile in the world. The figure below compares the Caribbean's
homicide rates for 2010 with the rest of the world. (UNODC Homicide dataset 2012)
Figure 33: 2010 Homicide Rates
2010 Homicide Rates per 10,000 persons, anually
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Rural Economic Security:
This factor is not relevant for transshipment analysis.
Economic Risk:
Morrison (1997) uses unemployment and aid to determine the economic risk of countries.
Due to the limited unemployment data for the Caribbean, I use Development Aid received only
in order to determine economic security. In Morrison's analysis, she divided countries by
whether or not they received aid; however, as most Caribbean countries get some development
assistance from other countries, I use the ratio of the development aid to the gross domestic
product (GDP) of the country. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) produces numbers of the amount of development aid that countries receive and the
World Bank provides numbers for the Gross Domestic Product. The Bahamas, which had the
highest GDP per capita in the Caribbean in 2009, see figure below, was the only Caribbean
country not to have received any development aid. Similarly, Haiti, which had the lowest GDP
per capita in 2009, received the most development aid. For my analysis, states with development
aid making up less than 1% of GDP had low economic risk, states with aid from 1% to 10% had
medium economic risk and states with aid making up more than 10% of their GDP had high
economic risk.
Figure 34: 2009 GDP per Capita & 2009 Development Aid as a % of 2009 GDP
2009 GDP per Capita and 2009 Development Aid as a % of 2009 GDP
$25,000 - 20%
$20,000 - 16%
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Source: World Bank dataBank, UNCTAD.
Nature of existing industries:
The nature of industries was used by Morrison to identify countries with many chemical
production plants, which may increase the likelihood of drug production. This is less relevant
for transshipment analysis.
Additional Factors:
In addition to looking at the factors identified by Morrison in her analysis, I have
included statistics on whether countries are failed states, on the level of human development, on
cocaine seizures and on trade as indicators of the likelihood of being a narco-transshipment-state.
Failed State Index:
Failed states are more susceptible to being corrupted by the cocaine traffickers because
the governance structure is weak and therefore the criminal justice system is at times similarly
weak. Additionally people may be more susceptible to bribes and payoffs from the traffickers,
this index is a proxy on the state-wide level for people to become involved in the drug trade. The
Fund for Peace devises index to assess whether or not countries are failed states. Countries are
ranked on 12 difference measures3 2 , each of which has a score of up to 10, which indicates the
worse conditions. Finland with a score of 20 is considered the healthiest state, and rank 177,
whereas Somalia with a score of 115 is considered the most failed state. (Fund for Peace 2012)
For the Caribbean, Barbados is the healthiest state and Haiti is the most failed. In fact,
Haiti is in the top 5th percentile of the failed states, and the first failed state in the Americas. Of
the top 7 failed states, Haiti and Afghanistan are the only two not on the African continent. All
of the other Caribbean countries in the study are in the healthy 50 th %-ile, with Barbados and
Bahamas making it into the healthy 2 5th %-ile. Dominica, St Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia and St.
Vincent & the Grenadines were not part of the study. (Fund for Peace 2012)
1 The measures are Demographic Pressures, Refugees and IDPs, Group Grievance, Human Flight, Uneven
Development, Poverty and Economic Decline, Legitimacy of the State, Public Services, Human Rights, Security
Apparatus, Factionalized Elites and External Intervention.
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Figure 35: 2012 Failed State Index, from least failed to most failed
1 2012 Failed State Index (FSI), from least failed to most failed
lb~ C4 4
Number indicates World Rank out of 177 countries ranked, higher rank and lower score indicates healthy state.
Source: Fund For Peace. http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid20l2
United Nations Human Development Index:
Development Aid measures the level of dependence on other countries, but not
necessarily the level of development in a country. I use the UN Human Development Index as a
means to determine the potential vulnerability on the individual level for involvement in the
cocaine trade. The UN devises an index to assess the level of development in a country. It
considers factors such as sustainability, education and life expectancy in determining the values.
Norway is the nation with the most developed humans, with a score of 0.943 and of the countries
studied, the Democratic Republic of Congo is the country with the least developed human, with a
score of 0.286 and a rank of 187. (UNDP 2011)
For the Caribbean, Barbados is the most developed nation, falling into the 'Very High'
category and Haiti is the least developed nation, falling into the 'Low' category. Aside from the
Dominican Republic, which is in the 'Med' category, all of the other countries in the Caribbean
have 'High Human Development', according to the UN. (UNDP 2011)
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Figure 36: 2011 UN Human Development Index, from most developed to least developed
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Source: UNDP 2011: UN Human Development Index. http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/
Total Volume Cocaine Seizures: Figure 37: Vol. of Cocaine seized from 2004-09
Total Volume of Cocaine Seizures from
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime 2004-09, in kg
(UNODC) produces an annual world drug report, 0 4,ooo 8,000 12,00016,000
which includes the amount of cocaine seized by Dominican Republic
Bahamas
country. In the Caribbean, since 2004 over and NevisSt. KittsanNei
44,000 kg of cocaine have been seized, this Trinidad and Tobago
. . Jamaica
represents about 1% of the global cocaine seizures
Antigua and Barbuda
for the same period. This number does not St. Lucia
include cocaine seizures in other parts of the Cuba
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world that came from the Caribbean. Dominican St. Vincent and the...
Republic has had the largest volume of seizures in Barbados
Grenada
the region, of 18,467 kg and Dominica has had the Dominica
least seizures in the region. The chart below Source: UNODCWDR 11: 
Seizures ataset.
depicts the cocaine seizures for the region (UNODC WDR 2011: Seizures dataset).
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Transshipment Risk:
Trade is another factor that may affect the
prevalence of the Caribbean as a transshipment
narcotics route, with the premise that more trade
may increase the likelihood of the trade routes
being coopted for nefarious shipments. Openness
to trade is a metric created by the UN
Commission on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD); it is calculated by dividing the value
of exports by the GDP for a country. In 2010,
Tuvalu in Oceana was the country with the
smallest openness to trade ratio at .96% and
Singapore was the country that it the most open to
trade with a ratio of 208%33. Within the
Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago is the most open
to trade ratio at 54% and Haiti the least at 17% (UN
Figure 38: 2010 Trade in Merchandise and
Services as a % of GDP
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as a % of GDP, Exports, 2010
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Source: UNCTADstat.
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Other Factors:
Poverty, inequality, and unemployment are other factors that may have added more
robustness to the model; however, this data was not available for more than the five of the
countries in the study and this reduces their effectiveness as a comparative measure.
Additionally, some of these data sources are available for the 1990s and because part of my
claim is that things have changed within the past decade, the numbers would not help with the
analysis. However, I believe that the Failed State Index and the Human Development Index
capture the dynamics that poverty, inequality and unemployment would add to the comparison.
* UNCTAD, Cayman Islands in the Territory with the smallest ratio with 0.50% and Hong Kong the territory with
the most at 221%. However this report is only looking at country analysis and not at territories.
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Risk of Narco-Transshipment-State:
The Table 3 below shows the raw statistics for the narco-transshipment-state analysis.
The US is included as a point of reference against the Caribbean countries.
Table 3: Narco-Transshipment-State Analysis: Raw Statistics
Crime Vnebi
Corruption Violent Cocaine I conomnic sta1te Inditial Ifatutr
Country
2011
Corruption
Perception
Index
2010
Homicide
rate per
10,000
person
Total
Volume of
Cocaine
Seizures,
04-09, in kg
Aid as a
% of
GDP
2012
Failed
State
Index
2011 UN
Human
Develop-
ment
Index
2010, Exports
as a % of
GDP
Antigua & Barbuda 7 1,660 0.5% 59 High 48.8%
Bahamas 7.3 27 8,049 0.0% 55 High 40.4%
Barbados 7.8 11 406 0.3% 52 Very High 47.8%
Cuba 4.2 5 977 0.2% 73 High 18.3%
Dominica 5.2 22 0 7.5% High 32.0%
Dominican Republic 2.6 25 18,467 0.3% 74 Med 22.6%
Grenada 11 109 6.2% 65 High 20.9%
Haiti 1.8 7 624 17.3% 105 Low 15.7%
Jamaica 3.3 52 2,353 1.2% 66 High 29.5%
St. Kitts & Nevis 38 5,375 0.8% High 30.9%
St. Lucia 7.0 25 1,107 3.7% High 47.4%
St. Vincent 5.8 23 614 4.6% High 26.7%
T&T 3.2 35 4,312 0.0% 64 High 54.2%
USA 7.1 4 874,971 0.0% 35 Very High 12.5%
Sources: Author completed from Transparency International 2012 Report,
Peace, UN, and World Bank Development Statistics.
UNODC WDR 2011 Report, UNCTAD, Fund For
The Table 4 shows the upper limits used to rank segment the values into high, medium
and low, where the high represent the highest likelihood of becoming a narco-transshipment
state. For 'Corruption Perception' and 'Economic Risk', I used judgment based on my analysis
of the data; for 'Development', I used the categories already assigned by the UN HDI and for all
other factors, I used the 33 rd %ile and the 67*%ile to determine the levels.
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Table 4: Narco-Transshipment-State Analysis: Upper Limits for Risk Evaluation
Drug
Seizures
Economic
Risk
Failed
State DeveloDment
Transshipment
Risk
Narco-
State
Risk
Narco-
State Risk
Score
p7.0 2 200 1% 66.1 Very High, High 27% Low 1
4.0 11 1,400 10% 82.4 Med 46% Med 2
0.0 82 875,000 100% 114.9 Low 222% High 3
Using the buckets above, I segment the factors into high, medium,
of 3, 2, and 1, respectively. Summing these factors, I derive the likel
becoming a narco-transshipment state. The following Table 5 my analysis:
and low with a score
ihood of the country
Table 5: Narco-Transshipment-State Analysis: Risk Evaluation
Country
Antigua and Barbuda NA
Bahamas LOW
Barbados La
Cuba Med
Dominica Med
Dominican Repubic
Grenada NA
Haiti
Jamaica
St. Kitts and Nevis NA
St. Lucia Med
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines Med
Trnddand Tobag
USA
Corruption Drug Failed
Perception Homicide Seizure Economic State Develop- Trans-
Risk Rate Risk Risk Risk Risk ment Risk ship m
From this analysis, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago are
at high risk; Dominica and Grenada are at low risk, and all of the other countries are at a
medium risk of becoming narco-transshipment-nations.
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Narco-Trans-
shipment-
State Risk
Med
Mod
Med
This systems approach highlights that the Caribbean is not vulnerable to the cocaine trade
because of the lack of development. It implies that the geographic may be the bigger reason for
the prevalence of the trade in the region. However, the lack of employment data in the analysis
reduces the credibility of this finding somewhat.
Conclusion
The leadership of the Caribbean has taken steps to deal with the transshipment of
cocaine, including (Klein 2001: 206-207):
o ACCP - Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police based in Barbados
1997 - Operation Summer Storm under the ACCP in 25 countries, resulting
in 828 arrests and 57 kg of cocaine being seized
o REDTRAC - Regional Drug Training Centre based in Jamaica
o CCLEC - Caribbean Customs Law Enforcement Council (CCELC) in St. Lucia, 1977
o CFATF - Caribbean financial Action Task Force in T&T
o PMO - Project Maritime Office, European Union supported
* JIHQ - Joint Intelligence Headquarters
o CBSI - Caribbean basin Security Initiative with the US in 2009 (Griffith 2011)
However, because of the geostrategic importance of the region, the trade persists. The
following chapter considers the global cocaine trade and the places the Caribbean into the
geospatial cocaine system.
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Chapter 4: The Global Drug Trade
The chapter zooms out from the regional scale to the global scale of the cocaine trade. I
show how T&T and the Caribbean are part of a global system, and that they are not the only
victims of the transnational cocaine trade as West African nations are prey for the traffickers.
First, I discuss the cocaine supply chain and briefly talk about the global production and
consumption patterns. Then, I focus on the reasons for the cocaine trade in West Africa, and I
posit that unlike the Caribbean, some West African nations are more vulnerable to the allure of
the cocaine trade. Following that, I argue that geostrategic location of the Caribbean, and West
Africa, has made them prey to historical transnational trade routes by showing some maps of the
transatlantic slave trade. Finally, I discuss the legacy of colonialism as it not only impacts crime,
but it also affects the type of government actions and community responses to crime that will be
discussed later in the thesis.
This chapter highlights the unintended consequences of interdictions, the effect of path
dependency, and the need for systems thinking when determining global cocaine interdictions.
The Cocaine Supply Chain
Production
Most of the coca bush, which is used to
make cocaine, is grown in Bolivia, Colombia and
Peru, see Figure 39, with Peru cultivating 61,200
ha, 41%, Colombia 57,000 ha, 38% and Bolivia
approximately 30,900 ha, 21%, in 2010
(UNODC WDR 2011: Table 20). Peru used the
be the world's larger producer of coca leaves
from World War II until 1997, when because of
law enforcement interdictions, Colombia took
over as the largest producer. Similarly, Peru is
Figure 39: Global Cultivation of Coca Bush, 2010
Global Illicit Cultivation of
Co6r
S.aA8
Source: UNODC, WDR 2011, Table 20 page 99.
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Bolivia
2P/o
once again taking over as law Colombia's
prominence declines. Much of the refinement of
the coca leaves into cocaine has occurred in
Colombia since the 1970s (UNODC 2011).
Although Peru and Bolivia are once again
increasing the production, global supply of coca
leaves decreased as production decreased in
Colombia, which was the biggest supplier on the
market. According to the UNODC, drug
enforcement interdictions, such as eradication,
reduced Colombia's output (UNODC 2011).
Figure 40: 2009 Cocaine Dist'n by Market
Estimate of the distribution of cocaine
markets by consumption, 2009
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1, Tables 4 and 5.
Figure 41: Global Coca Bush Cultivation (ha), 1990-2009
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Consumption: Demand and Price
In 2009, of the USD $85 billion in
cocaine consumed globally, an estimated
USD $37 billion, 44%, was consumed in
the USA and USD $36 billion, 42%, was
consumed in Europe, i.e. $73 billion, 86%,
of the global cocaine consumption
occurred in the US and Europe. By
weight, 157 tonnes, 36%, and 129 tonnes,
29%, of the cocaine was consumed in the
US and Europe, respectively. Using value,
2% and 0.2% of the cocaine were
consumed in Africa and the Caribbean,
respectively. Figure 41 shows the percent
breakdown of the regional global market
in 2009, by value and weight. And, Figure
I
Figure 42: Street Price per gram of Cocaine
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Source: The Economist, "The Cost of coke", June 23, 2011
ht //ww .economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/06/uns-world-
drug-report
42, shows the decrease of the US and the rise of the
European cocaine markets over time. (UNODC 2011: Table 5).
The street price per gram of cocaine is the highest in Europe and USA, which is why
producer want to sell their product in these countries, as the profitability is the highest. These
numbers also reflect the risk involved in selling in Europe and in the USA. Figure 42 shows the
price per gram of cocaine in selected countries.
Demand for cocaine has increased in Europe for various reasons, one of which is because
of the unintended consequence of the drug battles in the Americas. First, the conflict between
the Colombian and Mexican cartels in moving drugs to the US, resulted in the Colombians
actively developing the European markets. Additionally, as the US drug enforcement agents
successfully started seizing drugs and restricting the trade of cocaine, the trade expanded to other
regions to make a profit. Finally, the demand for cocaine in the US declined as Americans
moved to other types of stimulants for pleasure (UNODC 2011). All of these factors
contributed to the expansion of the drug trade into Europe. With a good understanding of the
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Figure 43 Value of US and West and Central European cocaine markets,
1989-2009 (constant 2008 US$ billions)
global relationships, system
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dynamics modeling may help to
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Due to the "War on Drugs"
and various enforcement interdictions, drugs cannot freely enter the US or Europe and vessels
coming from Bolivia, Colombia and Peru are under severe immigration scrutiny, so that
subterfuge and intermediary countries are needed to get the cocaine from the producers to the
major consumers. Consequently, Central America, the Caribbean and Africa, particularly West
Africa, have become heavily involved in the drug trade. As recently as 2011, a 'drug sub was
seized off the coast of Miami, coming from the Caribbean, with 15,000 lbs of cocaine with street
value of USD $180 million.34 Although some cocaine is consumed in these countries, their major
role is to be a transshipment point to get the drugs north (UNODC 2011).
As the Mexicans gained more control over the drug trade, cocaine started flowing up the
Central American coastline, as the Mexicans preferred those routes versus the Caribbean routes
that the Colombians preferred. However, with the growth of the drug trade in Europe, and the
Colombians gaining control of those markets, the trade through the Caribbean has increased.
Additionally, West African countries are being used more because of the African diaspora in
Europe, the poverty of many of the people and the lack of the governance in some of the
countries (UNODC 2011, Shaw 2002).
31 CBS News, "$180M In "Drug Sub" Cocaine Offloaded in Miami", CBS Miami, August 2, 2011.
http://miami.cbslocal.com/tag/caribbean-drug-seizure/.
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Transshipment regions such as
the Caribbean and West Africa face
comparable consequences from the
drug trade. William F. Wechsler, US
Pentagon's top counter-narcotics
officer, commented, "West Africa is
now facing a situation analogous to
the Caribbean in the 1980s, where
small, developing, vulnerable
countries along major drug-trafficking
routes toward rich consumers are
vastly under-resourced to deal with
the wave of dirty money coming their
,, 35
way
Figure 44: Global Cocaine Flows, 1998 and 2008
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Source: UNODC WDR 2011, Map 22.
* Savage, Charlie and Thom Shanker, "U.S. Drug War Expands to Africa, a Newer Hub for Cartels", The New
York Times, July 21, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/world/africa/us-expands-drug-fight-in-
africa.html? r=3&ref=africa
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Growth of the Drug Trade in West Africa
Economic/Political Reasons for Participation in the Drug Trade
Africa contains some of the poorest countries in the world. In fact, thirty-three of the
forty-eight least-developed countries, as defined by the United Nations (UN), are located in
Africa (UN-OHRLLS 2011)36. Additionally, the UN has created a Human Development Index
and categorized the results into Very High, High, Medium, and Low, many countries fall into the
Low category (UNDP 2010). This lack of socio-economic development has caused some
African countries to be vulnerable to the drug trade and other criminal activity (De Andres 2008,
Mair 2003, Terdman 2007, Kasrilis 2007).
The increase in illicit drug consumption in Europe and the worsening social, political and
economic conditions in some parts of Africa have created ideal conditions for the growth of the
transnational illicit drug trade on the continent (Akeampong 2005, McConnell 2009, Shaw
2002). Increased European consumption, in the 2000s, improved the profitability for participants
along the South American-African-European cocaine supply chain 37 . Additionally, the internal
fighting and civil wars have weakened the government in many countries and their ability to
secure their nation's borders; consequently, the porous borders, ease of movement and lack of
monitoring helped illicit drug trafficking to increase (Akeampong 2005, McConnell 2009, Shaw
2002, Wyler et al 2009, UNODC 2008).
The Illicit Drug Transnational Network
According to the UNODC (2009), some African countries have well-entrenched illegal
transnational networks and a widespread Diaspora that the trafficking groups can use. In 2009,
the UNODC in "Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat
Assessment" reported that US$3 billion of oil, cocaine, cigarettes and people were trafficked in
West Africa (UNODC 2009).
36 See map in Figure 6 of Appendix 1.
3 Nigerians were involved since the late 1970s and early 1980s when their economy went through recession (Shaw
2002).
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Narcotic seizures in Africa have grown exponentially within the past decade with over 46
tonnes of cocaine were seized from Africa to Europe in 2008 (UNODC 2008; Wyler et al 2009).
Senegal, Nigeria, Guinea and Mali have been identified that are the source of the most drugs
trafficked from Africa. Over 1,300 couriers were detected smuggling drugs to Europe from
Africa and 57% of these were from Nigeria (UNODC 2008, Shaw 2002). Figure 45 shows the
increase in cocaine seizures in West Africa.
Figure 45: Annual Cocaine Seizures in West Africa, 2000-2007
Annual cocaine seizures in West Africa, 2000 - 2007
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preliminary data for 2006 based on available data as of November 2007
from data collected by UNODC between January - November 2007
Source: UNODC Annual Reports Questionaires
Source: UNODC 2008: Figure 3.
According to Shaw (2002), a former research fellow at the Crime in Transitions Project at
the South African Institute of International Affairs, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg,
the transnational movement of illicit drugs in Africa involves many countries and players. South
American drug cartels use Angola as a key shipment point because of the Portuguese link with
the Brazilians. From the ports in Luanda, Angola, drugs are driven down through Namibia,
Botswana or Zimbabwe to get to South Africa, which is the biggest market for illicit drugs in the
Sub-Saharan African region. White South Africans, especially ones with European Union
passports are recruited as couriers because they are more likely than others to get through
customs undetected. Mozambique is also a key shipment point for drugs and Pakistani,
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Nigerian, and Mozambican groups Figure 46: Possible cocaine transshipment routes in W. Africa
operate there (Shaw 2002). Figure - Y
46 suggests some shipping routes. 3
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Source: UNODC 2009: Page 13.
Narco-Transshipment-State Analysis
Using the same metrics from the Caribbean analysis, I evaluate the conditions in West
Africa, as defined by ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States3 8 . Table 6
shows the factors that determine the likelihood of become a narco-transshipment-state. The
numbers in Table 6 come from the same sources as the numbers in Table 3. Following that,
Table 7 shows the analysis, using the same limits identified in Table 4. These numbers confirm
that West African countries are vulnerable to the drug traffickers particularly because of their
lack of human development, weak governance and dependence on aid.
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Table 6: Narco-Transshipment-State Analysis: Raw Statistics, West Africa
2011
Corruption
Perception
1I A
Homicide
rate per
10,000
erson
I U1ul
Volume of
Cocaine
Seizures, 04-
09Q in kw
Aid as a %
olf GDP
2012 Failed
State Index
2011 UN
Human
Develop-
ment Index
2010, Exports
as a % of GDP
Country n ep , g-
Benin 3.0 15.1 761 10.4% 79 Low 26.4%
Burkina Faso 3.0 18.0 70 13.0% 87 Low 16.4%
Cape Verde 5.5 11.6 5,375 12.2% 75 Med 34.5%
C6te d'Ivoire 2.2 56.9 14 10.3% 104 Low 49.7%
Gambia 3.5 10.8 44 13.0% 81 Low 10.3%
Ghana 3.9 15.7 2,402 6.1% 67 Med 29.0%
Guinea 2.1 22.5 442 5.2% 102 Low 35.9%
Guinea-Bissau 2.2 20.2 17.4% 99 Low 17.1%
Liberia 3.2 10.1 4 57.4% 93 Low 41.0%
Mali 2.8 8.0 5 11.0% 78 Low 25.1%
Niger 2.5 3.8 1 8.9% 97 Low 21.2%
Nigeria 2.4 12.2 1,907 1.0% 101 Low 37.5%
Senegal 2.9 8.7 2,562 8.0% 79 Low 25.7%
Sierra Leone 2.5 14.9 710 23.6% 90 Low 19.4%
Togo 2.4 10.9 981 15.8% 88 Low 36.8%
T&T 3.2 41.1 4,312 0.0% 64 High 54.2%
Sources: Author completed from Transparency Internationa 2012 Eeport, UJNODC
UNCTAD, Fund For Peace, UN, and World Bank Development Statistics.
Table 7: Narco-Transshipment-State-Analysis: Risk Evaluation
Country
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cape Verde
CMte d'Ivoire
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Mali
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo
T&T
Corruption Drug Failed Narco-Tirans-
Perception Homicide Seizure Economic State Develop- Trans- shipment-
Risk Rate Risk Risk Risk Risk ment Risk shipment Risk State Risk
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Comparison to the Transatlantic Slave Trade Routes
Figure 47: Slave Trade Routes
Source: http://ocotilloacademy.tompkinsfam.com/teacher-
resources/previous-years/2008-2009/the-last-best-hope/tlbh-
chapter-3
Source: http://www.learnnc.org/Ip/editions/nchist-colonial/1 904
Figures 47 and 48 above, show the transatlantic slave and trade routes as they existed
from the 1400s to the 1800s. These routes are comparable to the 2008 cocaine routes, in Figure
44 above, as Europe and the US remain the major destinations and the journey traverses the
Caribbean and West Africa. Additionally, Klein (2001) posits that the economic foundation of
the Caribbean was built on stimulants because the Caribbean provided sugar, rum, tobacco, and
coffee to many other parts of the world. He adds that, "On an operational level of distribution
and production, the drug economy fits neatly into an underground economy, which has
flourished in the region since the days of piracy". This implies that the geo-political conditions
necessary to promulgate the growth of the drug trade in the Caribbean were established since the
days of slavery.
The Legacy of Colonialism
Europeans once colonized most countries in West Africa and the Caribbean and they
imposed their rules and norms on the people that they governed. The colonial regime divided
people and created borders to suit their needs and to make governing easier. Additionally, they
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granted favors to tribal leaders who did their bidding and helped them to retain their dominance
over others in the society, thereby creating "patron-client" systems still apparent in some African
and Caribbean leadership models (Berman 1998, UNODC 2005). They used violence as an
action of the state, under the "state of emergency", to oppress the people that they ruled.
Furthermore, they used the "divide-and-conquer" model, which encouraged tribes to secure
wealth internally and not support other tribes. (Rajagopal 2003, Berman 1998, Ong'ayo 2008,
UNODC 2005).
Economically and institutionally, the colonials left their countries deprived, as they did
not develop the institutions, the government or the capacity of many of the people in order to
keep their dominance over them (arguably, this is more prevalent in some parts of Africa than in
the Caribbean). They did not develop manufacturing and left the countries with commodity-
based economies that were volatile to shifts in the market. As a result, the new leaders had to
work with underdeveloped institutions and weak economies post-colonialism (Berman 1998,
Mabogunje 2000, Ong'ayo 2008).
Additionally, some locals did not consider it improper to engage in activities outside the
purview of the established colonial legal system, as it was a way of defying the sometimes-
oppressive authority (UNODC 2005). Furthermore, economists and sociologists who study the
informal economy (of which some criminal activities are a part) believe that many informal
activities are a direct result of capitalism and capitalist growth (Castells and Portes 1989).
Hernando de Soto, an economist, argues that the informal economy comes because of the hostile
legal environment in which parties find themselves within the formal system (de Soto 1989).
Consequently, the gap between the legal definition of crime and the social definition for some
people increases especially during tough economic times.
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Conclusion
In thinking about the appropriate interdictions to reduce crime in the T&T and the
Caribbean, understanding the global system is important, as is observing the effects of the trade
on other regions of the world. This can help to inform policymakers when considering
strategies; for example, decriminalization of traffickers may be one strategy, if T&T considers
that they are unable to affect the global cocaine flows. Similarly, understanding the role of
colonialism on people's perceptions of crime and government helps to establish what types of
interdictions would garner the best response from the community. In the next section, I return to
T&T and consider the government's actions in response to the drug trade and the rising crime
rates.
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Chapter 5: The Government's Response to Crime
In this chapter, I discuss the government's response to crime, particularly to the crime
derived from the drug trade, which builds off the previous chapters. In chapter 2, I described the
crime conditions in T&T in terms of the rise of violent crime particularly of murders and attacks.
Additionally, I gave some examples of how the crime in T&T was linked to the global cocaine
trafficking network. In chapter 3, I broadened my geographic scope to show that the conditions
in T&T were not unique and that other countries in the Caribbean were struggling with increased
crime. I also tried to show some vulnerabilities that countries in the region face with respect to
citizens becoming involved in the drug trade. In chapter 4, I expanded to the global level to
discuss the cocaine trade and to identify the major countries in the supply chain. In that chapter,
I also showed that the West African region was susceptible to the cocaine trade and I briefly
touched upon the role of the transatlantic slave trade, which has scarred both the Caribbean and
West Africa, and established historical links between the regions for illicit trade. Finally, I
looked at how the shared colonial legacy created still-lingering animosity between the state and
the society.
Now, I examine some of the measures that the government has taken to reduce crime.
First, I list the institutions involved in decreasing the drug impacts on the country. These
institutions can be categorized by their work on demand reduction, supply reduction and support,
although there is overlap in what the groups do. Following that, I create a timeline that lists
some of the policies, bills and regional agreements that the government established to deal with
the drug problem, most of this information comes from the "National Anti-Drug Plan 2008-
2012" (Ministry of National Security). Then I look at the Police Service (TTPS), which is the
primary law enforcement agency tasked with dealing with the community and I touch upon two
major drug interdictions, the hanging of drug baron Dole Chadee, 1999, and the State of
Emergency, 2011. Finally, I discuss how to measure the effectiveness of the government policy
interventions.
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Ministries, Departments & Agencies involved in the Anti-Drug Initiative
Figure 49: T&T Anti-Drug Initiative Organizational Chart
Source: National Anti-Drug Plan of T&T 2008-2012: Figure 2
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The diagram above shows the public agencies that are working to lessen the effects of the
drug trade in T&T. Over 17 agencies and departments within the Ministries of National
Security, Finance, Health, and Social Development as well as the Office of the Attorney General
are assigned to create and execute various drug interdictions. The Organized Crime, Narcotics &
Firearms Bureau, OCNFB, of the TTPS, is well known in the community, as they are responsible
for many of the drug busts in the country, this was evidenced from the drug sample dataset, in
chapter 2, created by reading the newspapers.
Table 8: Agencies that work to reduce the affects of drugs in T&T
# Demand Reduction Supply Reduction - Supply Reduction - Other/Both
Operational Units Secondary Agencies
7 National Alcohol and Strategic Services Central Authority National Security Council
Drug Abuse Prevention Agency, SSA (1985)
Programme, NADAPP
(1988)
2 Association of Substance Organized Crime Drugs Inspectorate / National Inter-Agency
Abuse Prevention Narcotics & Firearms Chemistry Food & Drug Coordinating Centre
Organizations, ASAPO Bureau, OCNFB within Division
(2001) the TTPS
3 Counter Drug Crime Task Central Bank - Inspector Security Intelligence
Force, CDCTF (1997) of Banks Agency
4 Defense Force - Forensic Sciences Centre
Regiment & Coast Guard
5 Customs & Excise Special Anti-Crime Unit
Division of T&T, SAUTT
6 Civilian Conservation
Corp, Youth Outreach
7 Community Policing
Source: the National Anti-Drug Plan of T&T 2008-2012
The former Minister of National Security, Brigadier Sandy, suggests that more
coordination is necessary for these agencies to be more effective. He discusses establishing a
National Intelligence Agency (NIA) to help with coordination 39. However, coordination is
complicated and expensive; additionally too much coordination invites vulnerability to the
infiltration of corruption. Before a coordinating body takes over, in-depth institutional analysis
should be conducted to take stock of the role that each of the institutions plays in addressing the
cocaine problem in T&T. This system-wide analysis would identify effective programs that
39 Senator The Hon. Brig. John Sandy, "Major General Cameron Ross (Report on Intelligence Agencies), Address to
the speaker of the House.
http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.tt/MediaCenter/Speeches/Speeches20l 1I/ReportonIntelligenceAgencies/tabid/290/D
efault.aspx
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should be supported, as well as failed programs that should be stopped. The analysis would also
show where there are redundancies in what the agencies do. Some redundancy is good because
it means that more than one group of people are looking at an issue. Other redundancy might
lead to nothing happening, because each group thinks that the other group is working on the
issue. Finally, the analysis, which could include comparison to other areas also dealing with
cocaine transshipment spillovers, could identify where there are gaps in the system.
Institutions Focusing on the Control of Illicit Drug Trafficking
Table 9 below shows the number of departments or institutions working towards the
control of illicit drug trafficking for a few countries in the Caribbean and the US. This data is the
Evaluation of Progress in Drug Control 2007-2009 report for each country, Section IV. Control
Measures, A. Illicit Drug Trafficking 40. Table 10 shows the count of agencies that focus on each
of the categories.
Table 9: Regional Departments that Look at Illicit Drug Trafficking
National Authorities Responsible for 1) Coordination /
collaboration
mechanism
Controlling Illicit Specifically, Port Specifically, Specifically, Aerial 2) Info sharing
Drug Trafficking Security Maritime mechanism
3) Common
Interagency
Database
Barbados 1) Police, and 1) Customs, 1) Customs, none I) None
2) Customs & Excise 2) Police, 2) Police (coordinator), 2) Intelligence
3) Port Inc., and and sharing and
4) Coast Guard 3) Coast Guard networking
3) None
Dominican 1) the Nat'l Drug 1) Port Security 1)Nat'l Guard, 1) Police, 1) None
Republic Control Authority 2) Navy (coordinator), 2) Nat'l Guard, 2) Joint
Directorate 3) Coast Guard 3) Coast Guard, operations,
(NDCD), (coordinator), 4) Navy, training, inter-
2) Police, 4) Police, 5) Armed Forces, institutional
3) Military 5) Customs, and 6) Prosecutor's Office, network
4) Customs, 6) Prosecutor's Office 7) Customs, systems
5) Port Authority, 8) NDCD, and 3) None
6) Port Security 9) NDI
Authority,
7) Nat'l Bureau of
Investigations
(DNI),
8) Attorney General's
Office, and
40 Organization of American States, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, Multilateral Evaluation
Mechanism's Evaluation of Progress in Drug Control 2007-2009 for the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission, 2010.
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9) Office of the
Prosecutor General
Haiti 1) Police, 1) Port Authority 1) Coast Guard, 1) & 2) Inter-
2) Courts, (coordinators), 2) Port Authority, institutional
3) Customs Admin., 2) General Customs 3) Police, committee
4) Pharmacy Admin., 4) Customs, 3) None
Directorate, 3) Coast Guard, and 5) Nat'l Guard, and
5) Central Financial 4) Anti-Drug 6) Coast Guard
Intelligence Unit, Trafficking Office
6) Joint Information &
Coordination
Center,
7) Nat'l Port
Authority, and
8) Nat'l Airport
Authority
Jamaica 1) Constabulary Force 1) Police: Marine & 1) Police, and 1) Police, and 1) na
(Police) Port Divisions 2) Coast Guard 2) Army 2) Regional
(principal) meetings with
2) Defense Force intelligence
Coast Guard sharing groups
(assist) and bilateral
3) Customs agreements
3) Yes
T&T 1) TTPS: Organized 1) Customs, 1) Customs, 1) Air Guard, 1) & 2) Joint
Crime, Narcotics 2) Coast Guard, 2) TTPS, 2) TTPS, intelligence
& Firearms 3) Police, 3) Coast Guard, 3) SAUTT, gathering,
Bureau, 4) Immigration, and 4) Nat'l Coastal Radar 4) Coast Guard joint
2) Customs & Excise 5) Port Estate Surveillance (coordinator), and operations
Division, and Constables Centre, 5) Air Guard 3) None
3) Counter Drug Task 5) Air Guard, and (coordinator)
Force 6) SAUTT
US 1) Office of Nat'l Drug 1) Customs & Border I I different agencies 11 different agencies 1) & 2)
Control Policy, Protection, Interagency
2) Dep't of Defense, 2) Immigration & intelligence
3) Dep't of Homeland Customs and the DEA
Security, Enforcement, and 3) Yes
4) Dep't of Justice 3) Coast Guard
(Drug
Enforcement
Agency), and
5) Organized Crime
Drug Enforcement
Task Force
Program
Source: OAS, CICAD Country reports 2007-2009.
Table 10: The Count of Agencies working on the Illicit Drug trade
National Authorities Responsible for
Controlling Illicit Specifically, Port Specifically, Specifically,
Drug Trafficking Security Maritime Aerial
Barbados 2 4 3 none
Dominican Republic 9 1 6 9
Haiti 8 4 6 na
Jamaica 1 3 2 2
T&T 3 5 6 5
US 5 3 11 11
Source: OAS, CICAD Country reports 2007-2009.
This data indicates T&T is on par with the other Caribbean countries, but below the US
with respect to the number of agencies that work toward reducing the illicit drug trade.
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However, the US has the most comprehensive coordination system and an interagency database
that allows the departments to share information. If the US could be considered the standard,
then these results imply that redundancy in institutional roles may be necessary in dealing with
drug trafficking once there is a good mechanism for feedback and information sharing.
Timeline of Bills, Programs & International Agreements
Unless otherwise noted, the data comes from the National Anti-Drug Plan of T&T.
- 1961 - UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (amended by the 1974 protocol)
- 1971 - UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances
- 1971 - Inter-American Convention to Prevent & Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Forms
of Crimes Against Persons & Related Extortion that are of International
Significance
- 1987 - Venezuela-T&T, Agreement on Counter Narcotics
1987 - CARICON heads of' state develop a regional program for the control of drug
trafticking
- 1988 - UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances
- 1989 T&T camlpaign to create a permanent international criminal court to deal wxith the
drug trade problemI
- 1 991 Dangerous I Drugs Act. TT
- 1992 - Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
- 1992. Jul - TI$35 million cocaine seized at Cali Bay. Tobago from Venezuela (Griffith
1996)
- 1994 - The Bai I Act. TT
1992, Jan. - December 1994 - Caribbean. Operation Sting x which seized 9 tonnes of cocaine
and USD$90 in cash and assets (Griffith 1996)
- 1996 - Community Policing (Wallace 20 I 1)
- 1996 Inter-A merican Convention AgMainst Corruption
- 1997 - Counter Drug Crime Task Force (CDCTF) set up within the MNS to collect data on
drug-related activity
1997 Inter- American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacture of and Trafficking in
Firearms. Ammunition. Explosives & Other Related Materials
- 1997 ( )peration Summer Storm under the \CCP in 25 countries. resulting in 828 arrests
and 57 kg of cocaine being seized
- 1998 - Community Mediation Act, TT, ComImunity Service Orders Act. TT
- 1999 - Dole Chadee and 8 of his men hung (Fineman 1999)
- 1999 - Cuba-T&T, Cooperation Agreement to Combat Drug Trafficking
4 1Grigorian, Ellen, "The International Criminal Court Treaty: Description, Policy Issues and Congressional
Concerns", Congressional Research Service, Report RL30020, Updated January 6, 1999. Wikileaks Document
Release, http://fortunaty.net/org/wikileaks/CRS/wikileaks-crs-reports/RL30020.pdf.
78
2000 - UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime
2000 - Venezuela-T&T, Agreement to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding between
the maritime surveillance & control authorities, outlining programmes of
exchange of visits & establishing information exchange mechanisms for
facilitating joint action
2000 Integrity in Public Life Act, TT. Proceeds of Crime Act, T. Electronic Transfer of
Funds Act. IT, Sentencing Commission Act. T
2001 R IC 0 Task Force on Crime and Security (Griffith 2011)
0 i Crps (C t u
2002 Community Policingo re-established (Wallace 2011)
2002 - Inter-American Convention on iTerrorism
2004 National Drug Observator\ to integrate data collection. analysis and statistics for
drug-related matters
2005 Caribbean Court of Justice Act. TT
2006 -Police Service Act. TT, Police Complaints Authority Act. TT
2006 E1stablished the Implementation \ency for Crime and SCcurit\. IMP ACS (Gin ffith
20 1 1 )
2007 - 'TTPS established a ('rime and Problem Analysis branch to utilize data processing for
crime analysis and prediction (National Anti-[)rug Plan) and start the "Policing
for the People" initiative (Wallace 2011 )
2008. Apr - CA RICOM held a crime and security\ summit in T& I'that led to the adoption of
a Strategy and Plan of' Action on Cri me and Securit\
20 0 9 -- S initiated (aribbean Basin Seurity Initiative
2011 - T&T State of Emergency (BBC Latin America 2011)
2011 - FBI led Financial crimes training in T&T and officers from TTPS take part in
additional Financial Investigations training
Key: Supply Reduction: International, Regional. Local Ion :, Capacity
Building I Bilateral Agreements I Major Local Interventions
In addition to the programs highlighted above, T&T also has:
- Regional and international agreements
o Bilateral agreements with Canada, Colombia, Mexico, St Kitts & Nevis, the UK and
USA
o Draft treaties to Argentina, Costa Rica and Ukraine (through CARICOM)
42 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2012, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/185866.pdf
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o International and hemispheric plans of action within the Summit of the Americas, the
Anti-Drug Strategy in the Hemisphere, the Caribbean Forum of African Caribbean
and Pacific States and the Panama Action Plan
o Regional Plans of Action through the Caribbean Court of Justice, the Regional
Justice Protection Plan, the Inter-Governmental Task Force on Drugs and the Plan of
Action for Drug Control, co-ordination and Co-operation in the Caribbean
- Crime Stoppers at 800-TIPS (8477)
- Officers participate in various training programs. The former Minister of National Security
said, "It is expected that training programmes, such as these provided by BGTT, will help
officers develop the skills and competency that will improve service quality and reverse the
low levels of public confidence,"43
- Plans to increase use of CCTV cameras44
- Plans to bring back the death penalty 45
Hiring More Police Officers
Another response has been to hire more police officers. Currently, there are over 6,500
officers, divided topically into twenty-five departments, and geographically into nine divisions,
with a total of eighty-eight stations and substations, which are located in the more populous
regions in the country. Comm. Gibbs said that better alignment of Police Forces and not more
police officers are needed to improve the crime situation. He added that the Police to citizen
ratio in the country was high when compared to others. 46 In fact, Florquin (2011), in the Small
Arms Survey 2011, reported on the ratio of police officers and private security to the population.
In that survey, of the 70 countries profiled, T&T had the 7th highest Police rate in 2010, at 493
officers per 100,000 people. This rate is 1.6 times both Jamaica's 2010 rate and the Dominican
43 Achong, Derek, "Sandy: Govt aiming at reducing crime", T&T Guardian, August 9, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/08/09/sandy-govt-aiming-reducing-crime
44 T&T Guardian, "Gibbs: More cops not the answer", T&T Guardian, February 4, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/02/04/gibbs-more-cops-not-answer
4 BBC Latin America & Caribbean, "T&T urged not to resume executions", BBC Latin American & Caribbean,
February 17, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12495228
46 T&T Guardian, "Gibbs: More cops not the answer", T&T Guardian, February 4, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/02/04/gibbs-more-cops-not-answer
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Republic's 2008 rate. Additionally, it is 1.7 times the US's 2007, 2.2 times the UK's 2009 rate
and 2.9 times Nicaragua's 2008 rate. Finally, the police per 100,000 population rate in T&T in
1992 was 379, so the Police Force has grown by 30% although the population has grown by just
9% (Annex 4.1 of the Small Arms Survey 2011: Florquin 2011).
Major Drug/Crime Interventions
There were two dramatic ways that the government has shown force to signal that they
are committed to reducing violence and the drug trade. In 1999, nine men, including local drug
lord Dole Chadee were hung for murder and other crimes and in 2011, the country was placed in
a state of emergency because of the rising level of violence.
- Dole Chadee's Hanging
On June 4, 1999, Nankissoon 'Dole Chadee' Boodram and eight of his henchmen
were hanged for brutal murders of citizens, the first set of hangings since 1994 and the
last hangings since. Dole Chadee was a major drug dealer allegedly responsible for most
of T&T's drug trafficking, smuggling tonnes of cocaine for the Colombians through the
country. Although he was accused many times of drug trafficking, he was never
convicted, which added to his notoriety. It was only when he ordered a hit on a rival
family, did a member of his gang go to the police to turn him in. While in jail, Dole
Chadee was able to order the killing of the witness, but luckily, another member came
forward to ensure that the charges against Dole Chadee stuck. The Attorney General
used the hangings to "build confidence in law and justice" and to show that no one was
above the law4 .
47 Fineman, Mark, "Triple Hanging Returns Death Penalty to Trinidad", Los Angeles Times, June 5, 1999.
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/iun/05/news/mn- 44 3 46
ExecutedToday.com, "1999: Dole Chadee, crime lord", ExecutedToday.com, June 4, 1999.
http://www.executedtoday.com/2010/06/04/1999-dole-chadee-crime-lord/
The Guardian, "UK stays nune executions of Trinidad killings", The Guardian.co.uk, May 17, 1999.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/may/18/ 4
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No one in T&T has been hung since the Dole Chadee gang in 1999, but in 2012,
the current government is trying to bring back the death penalty to deter crime.
- The State of Emergency (SOE) in T&T, 2011
On August 21, 2011, the government declared a SOE allegedly because of the
increased levels of violent crimes and murders over the past few weeks in the country
(BBC Latin America 2011). During the SOE, a curfew was enforced in certain crime
hotspots and police officers were given the authority to act without warrants.
Effectiveness
Effectiveness in interdiction efforts could be determined via reduction of crime and
reduction in the volume of cocaine trafficked. However, it is beyond my capacity to determine
whether the volume of cocaine trafficked through T&T has decreased. In fact, the UNODC
(2011) has indicated that a reduction in seizures may just mean that the traffickers have found
more savvy ways to move the product that avoids capture. Instead, for each year between 1998
and 2009, the years have the national police statistics, I list the policies or programs started and I
show the change in the level of crime for that period. This is not an apples-to-apples comparison
as policies and programs need time to take effect.
48 Rambally, Rhonda and Alicia Llanos, "Murder must be categorized", T&T Guardian, January 16, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/01/15/murder-must-be-categorised
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Table 11: Government Action and Change in Crime Rate in T&T
ange Change Change Change Change
Major in all in the in the # in Minor
Minor non- Vol. of of Homi- Crimes
rcotic Narcotic Cocaine cides &
fences Offences Seized Offences
From this juxtaposition, we see that in the 1 1-year period beginning in 1998, there was a
decrease in non-narcotic crimes, but an increase in homicides. There was an increase in narcotic
offences, which could mean that either the TTPS became more effective at catching people or
more people became involved in the narcotics economy49. Seizure data is available from 2004
and it shows that the seizures drop drastically after major busts in 2005-2006. Similarly, this
49 These numbers include all narcotics, not just cocaine.
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Year Government Action Ch
in
Na
Of
1998 Community Mediation Act, TT,
Community Service Orders Act, TT
1999 Dole Chadee and 8 of his men hung,
Cuba-T&T, Cooperation Agreement to
2000 Venezuela-T&T, Agreement to
negotiate a MOU between the
maritime surveillance & control
authorities, Integrity in Public Life
Act, TT, Proceeds of Crime Act, TT,
Electronic Transfer of Funds Act, TT,
2001 Association of Substance Abuse
Prevention Organizations formed to
support NGOs that work on drug
treatment and rehabilitation,
CARICOM Task Force on Crime and
2002 Civilian Conservation Corps,
2003
2004 National Dru Observato
2005 Caribbean Court of Justice Act, TT
2006 Police Service Act, TT, Police
Complaints Authority Act, TT,
Implementation Agency for Crime and
2007 TTPS Crime and Problem Analysis
2008 CARICOM Strategy and Plan of
____Action on Crime and Securit
2009 US Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
Sources: TT Anti-Drug Report 2008-2012, TT CSO 2(
Dataset 2012
could mean that either less cocaine was trafficked through T&T after 2006 or that the traffickers
became better at evading capture. However, people tend to equate the murder rate with the crime
rate (Wilks 2007), and ultimately, that may be the main measure of the effectiveness of the
policies against crime.
Moreover, there are pressures on the government from the community, from businessmen
and from outside parties to deal with crime. As a result, the government has to show that it is
working to protect the community and to reduce crime; consequently, the policy documents may
be a signaling mechanism for the government to gain legitimacy, and may not reflect what is
actually happening. For example, Wallace (2011) talks about the failure of community policing,
yet community policing is a section of the TTPS website.
Conclusion
The Government of T&T has established a defense-in-depth approach to dealing with
crime in the country through various policies and actions; including youth outreach, community
policing and major shows of force. This response is similar to that of the other Caribbean
countries and somewhat less than the US. The overall level of crime has decreased, which
suggests that the various policing initiatives have been effective at reducing crime. However,
because violent crime, including homicides, has increased public perception of safety has
worsened. Due to the numerous policies and programs, it would be hard to suggest which ones
have brought about the best results; however, system dynamics modeling may help to identify
which ones are more successful. Additionally, it could help evaluate the expected time taken for
the ripple effects of the arrests, hangings and seizures to play out.
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Chapter 6: Public Perception of the Government's Response
In this chapter, I discuss the public perception of the government's response to crime by
focusing on the TTPS and giving a few reasons for the society's lack of faith in national security
service. I believe that this doubt in the protective services has contributed to the increase in
violence and has reduced the efficacy of programs set up by TTPS to work with the community
to reduce crime and participation in the drug trade. Understanding the interactions between the
TTPS and the society will help to explain the policy resistance and, consequently, to inform the
policy makers who look at ways to reduce crime in the country. This analysis is based mainly on
newspaper articles and literature reviews.
Although there have been various scandals regarding the TTPS, the biggest thing
working against them is that the crime has not decreased and people no longer feel safe. I briefly
look at its destructive colonial legacy and some of the scandals affecting the TTPS, including
scandals against the leadership, examples of police participation in the drug trade, and the fallout
from the SOE. Finally, I talk about the perception of police corruption and incompetence. All
of these contribute to why people have lost their faith in the system.
Colonial Legacy
Following the colonial system of law enforcement, some police officers came across as
unsympathetic, lacking in respect and violent in their attempt to gain the community's fear and
respect. Wallace (2011), in his paper on the failure of community policing in T&T, highlights
that policing started as the slave masters used select slaves to control the slave population and
prevent revolt. Policing, then, was a response to the slave owner's fear and a method of
domination. Rajagopal (2003), who theorizes that colonial rulers used state violence to keep the
peace, confirms Wallace's (2011) viewpoint. Consequently, part of the British legacy is that
some police officers sometimes appear to be bullies in the society. Additionally, when dealing
with young males some of the officers sometimes incite their anger instead of encouraging
positive change (Klein 2001).
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Scandals with the Leadership
- The Minister of National Security, Hon. Jack Warner
Since June 2012, Jack Warner holds the post as the head of the Ministry of
National Security. This appointment is rife with conflict because Hon. Warner resigned
from his position as a FIFA vice president under suspicion of bribery and corruption in
2011. According to Sondre Kaajford, a member of FIFA's ethics committee, had Hon.
Warner not resigned he would have been convicted for accessory to corruption 0 . Hon.
Warner denied these allegations and the Attorney General reminded the country that Hon.
Warner is "innocent until proven guilty"51. Additionally, in July 2012, members of
parliament from the Opposition requested that the Integrity Commission investigate an
million dollar US bank account opened in Hon. Warner's name. 52
- The former head of the Security Intelligence Agency (SIA), Reshmi Ramnarine
In the early 2000s, the prior political party while in power started the SIA, which
conducted covert operations, including phone taps, to determine drug lords and crime
risks as well as to weed out criminals. The present political party, which was elected in
2010, hired Reshmi Ramnarine to be the director of the agency, in January 2011,
although she was grossly under qualified 3 . When this news was leaked eight days after
her appointment there was a national scandal because of her lack of qualifications and the
manner in which she was appointed. Additionally, the Prime Minister Bissesar revealed
so Javeed, Asha anf Nigel Simon, "No doubt about guilty verdict against Warner", June 24, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/06/24/no-doubt-about-guilty-verdict-against-warner
5 John-Lall, Raphael, "AG defends Jack Warner: Innocent until proven guilty", T&T Guardian, May 29, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/05/28/ag-defends-jack-warner-innocent-until-proven-guilty
52 T&T Guardian, "Hinds wants investigation into Jack's alleged US$ account", T&T Guardian, July 28, 2012.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2012-07-28/hinds-wants-investigation-jackE2%80%99s-alleged-us-account
Singh, Nadaleen, "Rowley: Time to axe Jack", T&T Guardian, July 30, 2012.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2012-07-30/rowley-time-axe-jack
" T&T Guardian, "Rowley wants criminal probe into SSA fiasco", T&T Guardian, February, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/02/08/rowley-wants-criminal-probe-ssa-fiasco
Taitt, Ria, "Reshmi Resigns", T&T Express, January 22,2011.
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/RESHMI RESIGNS-i 14433029.html
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the SIA's methods of investigation 5 4 and accused the PNM of spying on the country,
adding to the society's lack of faith in the law enforcement system. 55
- The Police Commissioner, Dwayne Gibbs 56
In 2010, after 48 years of independence, the government appointed a foreign
commissioner of Police (Fraser 2010), Canadian Dwayne Gibbs who served as a
superintendent of Police in Alberta, Canada (Connelly 2010) before being chosen as the
new head of Police in T&T. I believe that this appointment served to signal outside
interests that the government was serious about dealing with the corruption in the Police
Force; however, it also served as a slap-in-the-face to the senior local police officers,
because it implied that they were either corrupt or incompetent.
Additionally, there was public outrage over the salaries of Comm. Gibbs and the
Deputy Comm. Jack Ewatski, also brought in from Canada. In 2010, Comm. Gibbs
made USD $20,784 monthly and DCP Ewatksi made USD $16,627 monthly; these
salaries were more than three times their next in commands and more than double what
they would have made in Canada"8 . This added to the belief that the men came to the
country for financial reasons rather than to help the country. Consequently, some called
for Comm. Gibbs to be removed, as he had failed to achieve what was expected of him59 ;
although, the government, who was responsible for determining whether the
commissioner performed effectively, did not find fault with his performance.
Perceived corruption and incompetence of the leadership of the Ministry of National Security
and the TTPS diminish the trust of the community.
5 T&T Guardian, "... House should condemn PM on 'spy tapes"', T&T Guardian, December 21,2010.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2010/12/21/house-should-condemn-pm-spy-tapes
5 T&T Guardian, "Govt wants Digicel help to tap cellphones", T&T Guardian, August 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/08/14/govt-wants-digicel-help-tap-cellphones
56 Since the writing of this paper, Comm. Gibbs and Deputy Comm. Ewatski resigned from their posts.
5 Taitt, Ria, "Million-dollar annual salaries for Gibbs, Ewatski", T&T Express," March 20, 2012.
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/Million-dollar annual salaries for Gibbs Ewatski-143592376.html
58 Simon, Akile, "Top cops "pay ridiculous"', T&T Express, August 20, 2010.
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/Top cops pay ridiculous -101208534.html. Conversion:
http://www.exchange-rates.org/Rate/USD/TTD
59 Seelal, Nadine, "Send Gibbs home!", T&T Newsday, August 23, 2011.
http://www.newsday.co.tt/crime and court/0,146077.html
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The State of Emergency (SOE), Police Racial Profiling and Brutality, Aug-Dec, 2011
AS mentioned in Chapter 5, in August 2011, the government called an SOE in response
to a sudden increase in homicides. Although there were many arrests and raids, some thought
that the SOE was uncalled for because it restricted citizens' actions 60 without making a
meaningful dent in the crime situation. In fact, more than 400 of the people detained during the
SOE were released when it was completed61. Some people felt that the SOE was neither
justified nor constitutional. Columnist Richard Ramoutar states that there is a "stark difference
between what constitutes threats to national security (drug trafficking, money laundering, human
trafficking, illegal firearms, environmental disasters, climate change) and how a state of
emergency is described under international law". He pulls from international law to state that,
"As such, internal conflict and unrest that do not constitute a grave and imminent threat to the
life of the nation and cannot justify derogations under Article 4 of the ICCPR. A mere local crisis
should not be used as a cover for a state of emergency (SoE)."62
Although it showed that the TTPS was serious about reducing crime, the SOE also
tarnished the reputation of the force as allegedly police brutality and profiling against black
people 63 increased during the SOE, for example:
- Garfield Butler, a 45-year old man accused the Police of beating him for no reason 64.
- Keon Quow, a 22-year old black boy living in Beetham Gardens, one of the crime hot-spots,
was wrongfully arrested during the SOE, because he lived in the wrong neighborhood6 s
- Fear of Police reprisal limited the number of complaints against them, posits the Gillian
Lucky, chair of the Police complaints authority66
6 0 T&T Guardian, "Come clean on SoE or lift it", T&T Guardian, November 10, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/editorial/2011/11/1 0/come-clean-soe-or-lift-it
61 Gumbs-Sandiford, "Clash in Cabinet over SOE 'failure"', December 4, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/12/04/clash-cabinet-over-soe-failure62 Ramoutar, Richard, "The demise of National Security", T&T Guardian, January 15, 2012.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/columnist/sunday-ianuary-15-2012/demise-national-security
63 Alexander, Gail, "Confronting SOE realities", T&T Guardian, September 10, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/columnist/2011/09/1 0/confronting-soe-realities
* Alexander, Gail, "'People afraid to report police misconduct in SOE"', T&T Guardian, October 4, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/10/03/pca-chairman-gillian-lucky-says-people-afraid-report-police-
misconduct-soe
6 T&T Guardian, "Moving on after SOE nightmare", T&T Guardian, October 10, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/10/10/moving-after-soe-nightmare
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Conversely, some people supported the SOE 67 and called for it to be extended beyond the
68
allotted period (Aug.-Dec., 2011), including the San Fernando Business Association 8
Additionally, some citizens have started calling into the Police hotline and providing information
to officers since the SOE; indicating that confidence in the TTPS has increased.69
These mixed reviews suggest that it may take a few more months to determine whether
the SOE was a success or failure. If people start cooperating more with police officers and
continue to use the Police hotline to report criminal activity, then the SOE would have been a
partial success. However, if it increased the rift between certain groups in the community,
particularly the young males, and the police officers, then the SOE would have been a partial
failure. Finally, if there were increased investment by foreign funders in projects because they
decide that the government is seriously working to reduce crime, then for the government, the
SOE would have been a financial success.
Corruption Perception
Below are a few examples of police officers allegedly involved in criminal activities,
which add to the belief that some officers are participants in the drug trade:
- On December 31, 2009, T&T Newsday reported that US$94,000 of money from a drug bust
went missing from the Couva Police Station (Seelal, 2009).
- On January 14, 2010, T&T Guardian reported that guns and ammunition went missing from
the Diego Martin Police station (Kowlessar, 2010).
- On February 27, 2010, T&T Newsday reported that about USD $250,000 of cocaine went
missing at the St James Police Station (Seelal, 2010).
* Alexander, Gail, October 4, 2011.
67 T&T Guardian, "Poll strong support for SOE, curfew", T&T Guardian, October 2, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/10/02/poll-strong-support-soe-curfew
68 Webb, Yvonne, "South Group also against SOE removal", T&T Guardian, November 5, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/11/04/south-aroup-also-against-soe-removal
69 T&T Guardian, "Jonestown murder suspect held" T&T Guardian, September 12, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/09/11/jonestown-murder-suspect-held
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The perception that police officers Figure 50: T&T Corruption Perception Index
are involved in the drug trade or are
T&T Corruption Perception Index (CPI), higher
corrupt have allegedly stopped people # indicates less corruption
from reporting crime. Transparency 5.0
International creates an annual corruption 40
perception index (CPI), which measures 3.0
the believed level of corruption in the 2.0
nation. A CPI of 10 indicates no 1.0
corruption and a CPI or 1 indicates 0.0
extreme corruption. In 2001, T&T's CPI 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011Source: Transparency International reports, various years.
was above 5, but since then it has
remained below the half mark. Additionally, the CPI decreased steadily until 2006, indicating
the actual corruption perception increased during this period. From 2006 to 2010, the perception
of corruption in the country improved, but then it dropped again in 2011. This change in
perception could be linked to many factors, I suggest a few below.
Figure 51: Potential Reasons for slightly improved
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Perception of Police Incompetence
Although some believe that police officers are corrupt, others think that they are unable
to match the strategic capabilities of the national and international criminals and drug lords
(Klein 2001). In fact, the former Minister of National Security said in 2011, "For too long the
T&T Police Service has been unable to provide the kind of service the public demands and
rightly deserves" 70 , when discussing the new training program.
In addition to the Reshmi Ramnarine debacle, the government's decision to unite the
Special Anti-Crime Unit (SAUTT), the SIA and the Strategic Services Agency (SSA) under the
umbrella of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) has been cause for ridicule. Keith Rowley
the leader of the Opposition Party said,
"The Government has succeeded in making a total mess of the country's security intelligence
system, whether it be the SSA, the SIA or the NIA, because the left hand does not know what the right
hand is doing". He added that the lack of cohesive and efficient national security agencies has made T&T a
laughing stock by major drug traffickers. "T&T is now a paradise for drug and arms trafficking," he said.
"There have been serious complaints raised by our Caribbean counterparts in light of the fact that our
national security system is in total shambles. "The drug dealers will have a field day because our eastern
and northern coasts remain unprotected." 7
Conclusion
This chapter provides suggests reasons why some members of the community do not trust
the national security system and, consequently, do not report crimes nor identify culprits; thereby
weakening the criminal justice system. Keith Scotland the attorney of Junnette Bascombe, wife
of a man killed by the Police, is asking that the FBI be called in to investigate the killings. "My
clients do not have any trust in the local Police," Scotland said."7  Additionally, Noriega, whose
brother was shot by police officers, feared for his life in 2011, because he believed that that the
Police killed his brother and would be after him next.7 3 Many people are living in fear in T&T;
70 Achong, Derek, "Sandy: Govt aiming at reducing crime", T&T Guardian, August 9, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/08/09/sandy-govt-aiming-reducing-crime
71 Kowlessar, Geisha, "How far will the NIA go?", T&T Guardian, April 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/04/18/how-far-will-nia-go
72 T&T Guardian, "Call for FBI in Moruga inquiry", T&T Guardian, August 4, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/08/04/call-fbi-moruga-inquiry
7 T&T Guardian, "Brother of man killed by cops fears for life", T&T Guardian, June 1, 2011.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/06/01/brother-man-killed-cops-fears-life
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they want the police to be effective in reducing crime, but some do not trust the police and
therefore do not help them to fight crime. For example, many people who witness crimes do not
come forward74 , as they do not trust the police to protect them because of the murdering of state
witnesses in the past.75
Public perception could be represented in a system dynamics model as a stock variable
that increases or decreases based on government action and the resulting level of crime. The
level of good public perception of the government would decrease when violent crimes increase,
but then increase when the government appears to have working plans for how to reduce crime.
Figure 52: Stock & Flow Diagram of Public Perception
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7 4 Ragoonath, Reshma, "Murdered man's wife begs witnesses to come forward", Trinidad Guardian, September,
2011. http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2011/09/05/murdered-man-s-wife-begs-witnesses-come-forward.
" T&T Guardian, "State witness killed", March 2009.
http://test.guardian.co.tt/index.php?q=news/crime/2009/03/30/state-witness-killed
Seelal, Nalinee, "State witness murdered", T&T Newsday, September 2007.
httn://newsdav.co.tt/crime/0.63596.html
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Chapter 7: Modeling Crime
Systems analysis techniques have been used in city planning, and particularly for the
criminal justice system, because they take into account the feedback mechanisms and
repercussions from various policies and actions. As Baynes (2009) put it, "The main strength of
complex systems science is not in adding greater precision to prediction.. .The strength of the
complexity thinking and approaches lies in developing a better understanding of system function
and complex interactions76". In this chapter, (1) I summarize literature on various modeling
techniques used in urban planning and criminal justice system; (2) I discuss the benefits of using
systems approaches to analyzing crime; (3) I pull from four specific system science papers on
drug and crime in analogous situations to do an analysis of the resulting policy analysis and; (4) 1
derive policy recommendations and strategies for T&T based on (3).
Types of Models
Econometric models have been used to analyze crime patterns and the efficacy of policy
interventions; for example: Friedman et al. (1989) investigated whether the crime rate was
positively correlated to police spending by doing statistical analysis on long-term and short-term
effects. Rydell et al. (1996) used econometric methods to model the market for cocaine by using
data and creating formulas to estimate supply and demand. Once they modeled the market, they
analyzed the cost of government interventions to determine the economic costs to society of
cocaine and its prevention. Machin and Meghir (2004) studied the effect of unemployment and
low wages on the crime rate, using regression analysis, and they found that crime is more
correlated with low wages than with unemployment.
Agent based models and cellular automata are other types of models used in modeling
complex systems that have been utilized within criminology. Agent based models involve
grouping people into categories based on prior criteria and using rules to determine their
7 6 Baynes, Timothy M., "Complexity in Urban Development and Management: Historical Overview and
Opportunities", Journal of Industrial Ecology, Volume 13, Number 2, pp 214-227, 2009.
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movement in time and space. Conversely, cellular automata models segment the system spatially
and consider crime patterns in terms of disease diffusion (Brantigam et al. 2011).
System Dynamics
System dynamics, a type of 'agent-based' model emphasizes the interactions among
various components within the system and the role of feedback mechanisms. Jay Forrester
(1969) developed system dynamics for industrial analysis and planning and first applied it to
urban phenomenon in 1969. Since then, other social scientists (Bard 1977, Blumstein 2002,
Lopez & Zuniga 2001) have applied it to the criminal justice system. This type of analysis helps
to illuminate cause-and-effect loops, identify information feedback characteristics and
distinguish interactive roles within the system (Bard 1977, Barney 1971, Tucker 2005).
Additionally, it helps to evaluate the unintended consequences and can include qualitative
measures, such as perceptions of safety or inclination to commit a crime and patterns of behavior
(Lopez & Zuniga 2001, Hovmand 2005, Tucker 2005, Bard 1977).
System dynamics also identifies reinforcing loops (Tucker 2005), which in this case may
be interventions that have helped reduce the crime rate. It allows for sensitivity testing, scenario
analysis, and it includes time delays, all of which help crime analysts and decision makers.
Finally, it looks at the issue of policy resistance, where the interventions to help a problem make
the situation worse, and try to identify the causes of the failure (Sterman 2001). Understanding
what interventions are working, would inform decisions on which programs to continue and
which to curtail. (Tucker 2005, Lopez and Zuniga 2001, Sterman 2001)
Examples of System Dynamics Models in Criminal Analysis
- Rod McDonald and Mohammad Mojtahedzadeh (2007) used system dynamics to model the
New York State criminal justice system.
- Dan Bernstein (1994) used system dynamics to model the dynamics of the New York City
Court system.
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- Homer (1990) modeled cocaine prevalence
Although there has been work applying systems thinking to the drug trade for the US
(Caulkins & Rueter 2010, Caulkins 2002), they do not directly apply to T&T because they deal
with modeling the demand the drugs and policies that work to reduce the local demand and
supply of drugs in communities. Additionally, there has been research conducted on the
dynamics of the supply side (Jaen & Dyner 2011), but this is outside the scope of my analysis.
As this paper deals with the transnational nature of the drug trade, I focus instead on the
models done on drug shipment in Mexico, crime in Jamaica, and crime in Colombia. For each
paper, I 1) show the models that the authors built; 2) briefly describe their methodology and
analysis; 3) summarize their recommendation and; 4) highlight how their recommendations may
lead to policy application for T&T.
Analysis of System Dynamics Models that Pertain to the Situation in T&T
1.
Paper: Wilks, Jason, Hugh Morris, Tameka Walker, Matteo Pedercini and Weishuang Qu, "A
Dynamic Analysis of Organized Crime in Jamaica", 2007 International Conference of the
System Dynamics society and 5 0 th Anniversary Celebration, July 2007, Massachusetts
Goal: Wilks et al., use system dynamics modeling to determine whether reducing gang
membership, increasing policing or increasing welfare would be most effective in reducing crime
and prison sentencing in Jamaica.
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Methodology: Using data on Jamaica and expert opinion, Wilks et al. determine how gang
violence, the economy, poverty and the criminal justice system interact with each other. They
use gang-members as the unit of analysis because males 15-24, who were part of gangs,
committed most of the violent crimes and therefore, they determined that the best interventions
would come by analyzing this group. As a result, the key feedback loop that they consider
revolves around the gang membership and its impacts on the society and economy. Additionally,
they incorporate social disorganization theory and rational choice theory to determine the
criminal behavior that underlies the model. Modeling from 1990-2030, they estimate how
changes in the rate of gang membership, government law enforcement intervention and welfare
programs affect 'gang related shootings', the 'real gdp at market prices', 'total employment',
'average share of population below the poverty line' and the 'prison population'.
To conduct their analysis, first they test their model with data back 15 years to 1990 to
ascertain that their assumptions work, then they test three different scenarios for 25 years, until
2030. They simulate what happens when 1) gang membership is reduces by 20% by 2030 (crime
reduction); 2) government expenditure in national security doubles by 2030 (security); and 3)
government increases Welfare from 2.9 billion Jamaican dollars to 5 billion Jamaican dollars and
increases the share of welfare to the lowest quintile from 0.5 to 0.8. Each scenario is tested
against the baseline of what is expected to happen if no intervention occurs. The picture below
shows a sample of their results.
Figure 54: Crime reduction decreases murder rate
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Figure 13: Crime Reduction Scenario
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Findings/Recommendations: They find that
- In the base case, gang related murders and shooting will eventually taper off by 2022, which
is 17 years from the modeling year. The prison population, however, will continue to
increase during the period
- All scenarios show an improvement when compared to the base case, so government
intervention can reduce crime on the long run, i.e. crime still grows, but at a lower rate than if
there was no intervention
o In the crime reduction scenario, murders start dropping off by 2015 (in 10 years) and
the prison population is slightly higher than the base case
o In the security scenario, murders start dropping off by 2017, and it drops lower than
the crime reduction scenario (1,291 vs 1,598). The prison population is much higher
under this scenario
o In the welfare scenario, murders are slightly less than the base case scenario and the
prison population is about the same
- Increasing the Welfare to poor families has less impact on gang related murder and the prison
population than doubling the Police Force or reducing gang membership
- Direct measures are more effective than indirect measures
- Crime reduction programs scenario resulted in less gang related murders in aggregate over
the time modeled
- With increasing the security, the prison population increases dramatically resulting in a strain
on the judicial system
Applicability to T&T: This study applies to T&T because
- Gang-related murder is the leading cause of murder in both T&T and Jamaica. Learning
from their data will help policy makers avoid some of the mistakes that they made in
devising strategies to deal with crime
- Young males are the major participants in gang violence in both countries
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- Like T&T, Jamaica is a Caribbean island devastated by the side effects of the cocaine trade.
Unlike T&T, Jamaica has a larger marijuana production market and is closer to USA so that
conditions there are more aggravated
Critique: The authors went to low income neighborhoods (garrisons) and used young males as
their study set, because most of the violent crimes are perpetrated by this demographic.
However, their analysis does not incorporate the institutional, economic and social challenges
that have occurred over decades to form these garrisons. As a result, it is not surprising that their
findings indicate that indirect measures, geared toward improving economic conditions, are less
effective at reducing crime.
2.
Paper: McGee, Sibel; Joel, Michael; and Edson, Robert, "Mexico's Cartel Problem: A Systems
Thinking Perspective", Applied Systems Thinking Institute, Analytic Services, Inc, presented at
the 19 th International Conference of the System Dynamics Society on July 24-28, 2011 in
Washington DC.
Goal: To evaluate the drug cartel problem in Mexico, with systems thinking, and to determine
the relationships within the Mexican society that reinforces the cartels. This paper also analyzes
the interventions of the Merida program, which was set up by the Obama administration to aid
Mexico in dealing with crime.
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Figure 4: Complete Causal Loop Diagram of Mexico's Cartel Problem
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Methodology: McGee et al. use the Conceptagon, a stepwise approach to systems thinking to
evaluate the cartel situation in Mexico. With publicly available data and literature, they try to
determine the key activities by the society that enable the cartels to grow. They focus on three
systemic failures, namely, the failure of the economic system, the education system and judicial
system to determine the expansion of the cartels in Mexico. Although they do not run the model,
nor do they provide quantitative evaluation, they use the feedback loop diagrams to highlight
important feedback mechanisms that could inform policymakers.
Highlight of the model that pertains to T&T:
Figure 56: Illicit Cartel Activity Loop
This section depicts the
relationship between the drug
Strafficking and the arms
smuggling. This relationship is
crucial in understanding the rise
in homicide rate in T&T.
Source McGee et al 2011.
Figure 1: Illicit Cartel Activities
Findings/Recommendations: They find that
- Although quick strong responses to crime have immediate results, these results are not long
lasting. They consider these results to be low leverage and posit that high leverage long term
results are needed to improve the cartel problem in Mexico
- Criminal justice reform, education reform and economic development are needed
simultaneously to bring about long term change and partial responses will not be effective
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- Exogenous factors, such as the US demand for cocaine, so improving policing on the US side
of the border, to decrease the movement of guns, drugs and money is necessary to reduce
cartel growth in Mexico
- For the Merida project, the authors caution against having mainly technical improvement to
the Police Service and not larger institutional change
- Although the long term changes require resources, they are worth the investment
- Future systems research, modeling and simulation is needed because it takes a holistic
understanding of the problem, and a dynamic method of simulation, to devise effective long
term solutions
Applicability to T&T:
- Mexico is also part of the transnational drug trafficking trade, as cocaine moves from South
America into the US through Mexico. Unlike T&T, because of the border with the US,
Mexican cartels power in the network
- Human trafficking and immigration components of the model not relevant for T&T
- The SOE in T&T was an example of a low leverage intervention which had immediate
effects but seems unlikely to affect the trade in the long term and may actually exacerbate
crime
- Exogenous factors are the main drivers of the drug trade through T&T, and if that is not
addressed local interventions may be unsuccessful
- Obama Administration invested hundreds of millions of dollars to deal with drug
enforcement in Mexico through the Merida Initiative, this is similar to the millions that the
Administration is contributing to the Caribbean through the Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative (CBSI) to deal with the drug problem
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Critique: Although the authors use the system dynamics model to explore growth of cartels
system in Mexico thoroughly, they do not provide much information on how they would actually
run the model to get results. This takes away from the practicality of the paper.
Figure 57: System Wnablers of Cartels Loop Regarding their
assumptions, the model
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Figure 3: Systemic Enablers of Cartels in Mexico Source: McGee et al. Additionally, it does not
consider how the severity of the penalty may also affect the likelihood of criminal participation.
The model implies that if the law enforcement had more money than the drug cartels, then the
influence of the cartels world decrease, but this may not be the case. Finally, it does not take into
account individual's penchant for risk and it does not cite any major criminal behavior theory for
underlying its model.
3.
Paper: Lopez & Zuniga, "A System Dynamics Model of Crime" 1 9th International Conference
on System Dynamics, Atlanta Georgia, July 2001
Goal: Lopez & Zuniga look at the externalities that come with growing crime. Using System
Dynamics, they model how increased law enforcement activity might actually lead to more
crimes being committed.
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Model:
Figure 58: System Dynamics model of Criminal Justice System
Jalcapeay
Perceived crime
Figure 3. A model or crime dysamics.
Source: Lopez & Zuniga 2001
Methodology: Lopez and Zuniga use literature review and data available for the US, Argentina,
Brazil and Costa Rica to build their model showing the relationship between criminal acts and
the likelihood of punishment. This perception is based on the efficiency of the criminal justice
system. They simulate various scenarios over 60 years to see the long run effects of changes in
the judicial system to crime.
First, they analyze the data and use econometric literature on crime to derive formulas
and make assumptions for the model. For example:
- Formula Pendingcasest = Pendingcasest.I + 8t (Arrests - Dropped - Trials) (page
10)
- Assumptions
o "the individual propensity to report a crime will decrease when the judicial
workload is high" (page 9)
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o "judges will tend to dismiss more cases if their observed workload is high
(page 8)
o "the perceived probability of punishment is affected by the number of
individuals who, indeed, are sentenced and imprisoned after all legal
procedures are completed" (page 8)
Then they run the model over a 60-year horizon.
Findings/Recommendations: Lopez & Zuniga suggest from their model
- Increasing the number of police officers reduces crime in the short run, but may increase
crime in the long run, because the criminal justice system becomes overburdened
- Once the perception that the probability of punishment decreases, adding resources to deal
with the crime issue may not immediately remove this perception as it takes about 15 years
for the perceived probability of punishment to increase once it has started decreasing.
- There is a 15-year time lag between investment in the justice system and long-term reduction
in time, therefore a politician probably would not see results during his/her tenure in office
- The return on investment into the apprehension-based programs will be less than anticipated
because of potential overcrowding effects in the judicial system
Applicability to T&T: This model applies to T&T because
- T&T has increased its Police Force by almost 2,000 people and it has a high rate of police
officer per capita
- Government acts like the SOE focus on apprehension
- The model is based on countries like Brazil and Costa Rica which are also impacted by
cocaine trafficking
- This model suggests weakness of a 'get tough' policy without attention to the whole criminal
justice system
105
Critique: The model places much weight on jail capacity and sentencing as it assumes that once
the capacity is reached judges will change their sentencing patterns and less people will report
crimes. His analysis implies that building more and improving the capacity ofjudges would
increase the number of crimes reported and reduce increases the number of arrests and
convictions. This would result in a higher perception of punishment and a reduction in crime.
To validate his argument, he should show where areas with more jails have less crime.
4.
Paper: Olaya et al., "Theorizing About Crime: Elements for a Contribution of System Dynamics
to Criminology", Presented at the 28th International Conference of the System Dynamics Society
on July 25-29, 2010 in Seoul, Korea.
Goal: Olaya et al. use system dynamics to create a theory of crime that includes "i) its
indigenous character and ii) its dynamic nature". They investigate possible reasons why people
commit crime, in Colombia, using a systems thinking approach.
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Model:
Figure 59: System Dynamics model of Crime Theory
Age
Figure 1. A first dynamic theory of crime based for the Colombian society
Source: Olaya 2010
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Highlighted loops that pertain to T&T as they show feedback mechanisms that occurs
from regulation and other crime interventions:
Figure 60: Regulation of Crime Loop
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Figure 3. Regulation of crime
These loops highlight
how state effort affects the
inclination to crime in
individuals.
Figure 61: Reinforcement of Crime Loop
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Figure 1. Reinforcement of crime
Methodology: First, they discuss existing theories of criminal behavior, such as the rational
choice theory, and they discuss the need for systems thinking to understand criminal actions
better. Then, they use the model to show ways that criminal learning affect criminal behavior.
The authors did not run the model.
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Findings/Recommendations: Olaya et el.'s recommend that the government:
- Create policies that take into account that people learn from other criminals. For example,
the judicial system should penalize people based on their level within the criminal
organization, because less seasoned criminals may learn to become experts from more
experienced ones otherwise
- Create crime theories that take into account dynamic relationship and local conditions; then
design policies based on these crime theories
- Design models and test theories through simulation
Applicability to T&T: I chose this model because
- Unlike the other models, it focuses on the individual level and it provides an individualistic
theory of criminal behavior that can inform policymakers. Understanding why people turn to
crime is pertinent to figuring out how to get them to change their behavior
- Colombia is also a victim of the drug trade and the resulting criminal activity
- The model takes into account drug trafficking
Critique: Unlike the other models examined on the paper, this one tries to model individual
behavior and inclinations. As a result, it considers system effects but focuses more on the
decision patterns of an individual. It provides more of a conceptual framework than a system
dynamics model that could be run. Moreover, it does not try to provide any metrics for
quantitative analysis using the model.
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Comparison of Models
Table 12: Comparison of the Major Features of Finding of the Models
Wilks et al. 2007 McGee et al. 2011 Lopez et al. 2001 Olaya et al. 2010
Country Jamaica Mexico a generic model based Colombia
on literature and data
from Argentina,
Brazil, Costa Rica and
USA
Focus Gangs Cartels Criminal Justice Individual inclination
System (CJS) to crime
Did the run Yes No Yes No
the model?
Time 1990-2005 (current) 2000-2060
Horizon 2005-2030
Reason for Gang violence also the Cartels in Mexico To understand the To understand how
selection main cause of violence have grown because of impact of interventions system dynamics
in T&T cocaine transshipment to the cjs models can be used to
show factors that
Young males make up influence individual
the gangs in both T&T choice
and Jamaica
Compares the results
of 3 main types of
Iinterventions
Time Lags Years for gang-related 15 year time lag
murder rate to drop: between the
With no investment in the ejs
intervention: 17 and sustainable
With gang reduction decrease in crime
plan: 10
With more govt
spending on security:
12
With increased
welfare: 22
Major Direct measures, such Criminal justice, Increasing policing Create policies that
Finding as gang reduction and economic and decreases crime in the take into account that
increased security, educational reform short run, but may people may learn
more effective than needed for long term increase crime in the from more seasoned
indirect measures, reduction in crime. long run because of criminals
such as increasing Partial response will back up in the CJS
welfare not be effective I I _I
Although the findings seem to be contradictory, I think that they all have value that can
be applied to T&T. In the Lopez et al. (2001) paper, the increased policing resulted in increased
crime because the criminal justice system was not able to handle the increased arrests and people
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got lighter sentences thereby reducing the role of penalties as a crime deterrent. This implies that
with the increase of police officers, there should also be an improvement of the criminal justice
system, which is what the McGee et al. (2011) paper suggests. Although the Wilks et al. (2007)
paper finds that direct strategies are most effective, it also finds that the economic strategy
reduces crime, when compared to the base case. The Wilks et al. (2007) paper only compared
partial strategies and did not look at the result of combination strategies, as is what the McGee et
al. (2011) paper implies. The Olaya et al. (2010) paper is not as comparable to the others.
Recommendations for the Government of T&T
The following table summarizes the finding and recommendations and I have added some
policy suggestions:
Table 13: Policy Suggestions for T&T based on System Dynamics Findings
Area of
# Author Title Study Recommendations Policy Suggestions
Give programs a chance to
mature and the government
should create an education
campaign to let people know
Government intervention can reduce that the plans will take a few
crime on the long run years before sustainable results
Improve the Community
Increasing the Welfare to poor Policing program to work with
families has less impact on gang CBOs and NGOs to reach out to
related murder and the prison young males, the demographic
A Dynamic population than doubling the Police group most likely to involved in
Wilks Analysis of Force or reducing gang membership gang violence
1 et al. Organized Jamaica Set realistic goals for programs
2007 Crime in that target welfare provision to
Jamaica reduce crime. These programs
are necessary, but will not
Direct measures are more effective drastically reduce crime in the
than indirect measures short run
Crime reduction programs scenario Support programs geared
resulted in less gang related murders towards Reducing gang
in aggregate over the time modeled membership
With increasing the security, the If the government is going to
prison population increases as we hire more police officers, they
as the strain on the judicial system should ensure that there are
enough lawyers, judges, jails
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and prison officers to deal with
increasing arrests
Low leverage interventions bring
quick results, but high leverage
interventions are needed for
sustainable improvements
Continue to invest in improving
police capacity through
education and involvement in
international training programs
Criminal justice reform, education Improve criminal justice system
reform & Economic development are by increasing capacity, one such
needed to bring about long term way is to award scholarships for
change and partial responses will not students wanting to be police
be effective officers, lawyers and judges
Exogenous factors, such as the US Continue to work with the
demand for cocaine, need to be CARICOM as well as other
addressed in order to improve the international and regional
Mexican situation programs such as the US CBSI
Educate the public about the
intervention programs and the
Although the long term changes time and effort that they require
require a lot of resources, they are is important to getting their
worth the investment approval the programs expenses
Future systems research, modeling
and simulation is needed because it
takes a holistic understanding of the
problem, and a dynamic method of
simulation, to devise effective long
term solutions
Continue to direct resources into
TTPS Crime and Problem
Analysis Branch and the
National Drug Observatory to
collect data and use it for crime
modeling and simulation
I 9
Increasing the number of police
officers reduces crime in the short
run, but may increase crime in the
long run, because the criminal justice
system become overburdened
Do not hire more police officers,
but instead continue to work on
increasing their capacity and
productivity
Once individuals perceive that the
likelihood of punishment decreases,
adding resources to deal with the
crime issue may take about 15 years
to remove this perception Increase conviction rates
There may be a15-year time lag
between investment in the justice Have patience that the
system and long-term reduction in procedures are working and be
time, therefore a politician probably cautious of doing major showy
would not see results during his/her interventions, that may in turn
tenure in office worsen conditions
The return on investment into the
apprehension-based programs will
be less than anticipated because of
potential overcrowding effects in the
judicial system
Ensure that there are enough
jails, prison officers, judges and
other professions needed to
support the criminal justice
system
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Create policies that take into account
that people learn from other
criminals
Create crime theories that take into
account dynamic relationship and
local conditions; then design policies
based on these crime theories
Design models and test theories
through simulation
_______________________ J I
Continue to encourage
community service and other
punishments for people
convicted of minor felonies
Work with universities and other
research partners to ensure that
long term analysis of crime
conditions are being considered
Hire systems analysis
consultants and planners to run
the models and to evaluate
performance
Conclusion
The system dynamics analysis highlights that there is at least a 10-year time lag for
projects to take effect and for sustainable changes to occur. In T&T, projects and programs need
time to grow and the government should set realistic expectations of what the program should
accomplish and the time that it would take. The multi-year and multi-faceted approach that is
required to bring about sustained change suggests that a planner should be hired to direct the
change and keep projects going over time.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
In this chapter, I summarize my findings regarding the crime problem in T&T and
systems analysis approaches to address them. Then, I do a brief stakeholder and institutional
analysis which will aid in identifying planning options and pathways as well as in adopting and
implementing appropriate policies. Following that, I finish with further research and
conclusions.
In previous chapters, I established that crime was a major problem in T&T and I showed
the rapid growth in crime since the 2000s. I posited that this growth was because of the drug
trade in the T&T, which caused an increase in accessibility of guns, and the creation of gangs,
who are the major perpetrators of violence. To validate my position, I looked at the increasing
crime rate in many Caribbean countries. Additionally, I did a narco-transshipment state analysis,
which identified some of the vulnerabilities that Caribbean countries face. Further, I looked at
the global cocaine system and the role that the Caribbean played, and I compared the Caribbean
region to the West African region, which is a growing transshipment node for cocaine.
After demonstrating that the cocaine trade could indeed be a major cause of the increase
in violence in T&T, I returned to the local scale to describe the government's response.
According to the Anti-Drug National Plan,
- between 1998-2009 there have been 9 Acts passed to address some aspect of the trade
- there are 17 operational groups that look at ways to reduce its impacts
- T&T has bilateral agreements with 8 countries, or rather 1 Icountries if the agreements
through CARICOM are considered
- T&T is in about ten international conventions and plans
- TTPS has established Civilian Conservation Corps to reach out to youth, a National Drug
Observatory to collect and analyze drug-related crime data, and a Crime and Problem
Analysis branch
Additionally, T&T has hired a foreign police commissioner, hung a drug lord and held a state
of emergency in order to reduce crime.
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The effectiveness of these responses is undetermined as the murder rate remains high and
people's perceptions of the government's actions remain low. However, changes in crime
fighting strategies can take some time to be realized as many factors and institutions are
involved.
The crime and law enforcement situation in T&T needs systems analysis to determine the
major levers that trigger or curb crime and how best to invest national resources to reduce it. On
August 15, 2012, the head of the Ministry of National Security (MNS), Hon. Warner was
budgeted an additional TTD $289 million (USD $45 million) to continue the fight against crime
in T&T77. This is a 12% increase on the 2012 estimated budgetary expenditure for 'Police and
Fire Protection' and 6% on the expenditure for 'Defence/Public Order and Safety' 78. Hon
Warner laid out his plan to spend the money, which included hiring 5,000 more police officers,
but he did not mention his analysis or his criteria for coming up with the plan. I argue in this
paper that a systems analysis approach is needed to understand the causes of the crime and to
create a framework to devise solutions that are interconnected and sustainable. To strengthen
this argument, I analyzed four specific system dynamics models that look at comparable cases
and I applied their findings to T&T.
System dynamics findings and T&T
The models indicate that it would take at least 10 years for some of the interventions to
take affect and bring about sustainable reduction in crime. Unfortunately, because crime is a
major political topic in T&T and elections occur every five years, the government has not been
able to invest in long-term systemic change that takes at least to decade to realize. Once the
government selects a plan of action, it should launch education campaigns and other promotional
events explaining that the plans would take at least ten years to see the results.
Additionally, the models imply the importance of an integrative approach, which a
planner would provide, as various organizations and groups need to work together to bring about
17 Ramdass, Anna, "Jack gets $289m to fight crime", T&T Express, August 16, 2012.
http)://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/Jack gets 289m to fight crime-166500876.html
78Republic of T&T Draft Estimate of Expenditure for the Financial Year 2012. Text prepared by the Ministry of
Finance - Printed by the Government Printer , POS. Page 40.
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change. Planners could determine the sequence of actions to address the system effects as well
as put in checks and balances at the appropriate times. Moreover, planners would be able to
continuously monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of programs that are put in place.
Building a system dynamics model for T&T
To build a system dynamics model for T&T, the potential variables, the stocks and flows
and the key interactions need to be considered. Below are some suggestions for each of these
categories based on factors identified in this study.
Potential Variables
- Drug Business
o Volume of drugs trafficked through the T&T and the Caribbean (derived from the
UNODC data)
o Volume of drugs seized (UNODC)
- Crime
o Crime rates (TT CSO for all except kidnapping), Kidnapping rates (UNODC)
- Socio-Economic Conditions
o Human Development Index (UN)
- Government Action
o Government Expenditure of Defense and Security (Annual Budget Expenditure
Estimates)
o Police per 100,000 population (Small Arms Survey)
- Public Perception
o Corruption perception (Transparency International)
o Codifying newspaper articles
- Miscellaneous
o Number of Deportees (US Department of Homeland Security)
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Stocks and Flows
In system dynamics modeling, stocks represent things that can be accumulated and flows
represent the input or output from the stock. A simple example is that of a bathtub, the tub
represents the stock which can the filled up or emptied of water and the faucet and the drain are
the flows. The faucet would be the input flow and the drain the output flow 79. For T&T, here
are some examples:
- Of stocks: level of crime, number of murders, public trust, and number of police officers
- Of flows: rate of arrests, and rate of convictions
Key interactions and feedbacks
The interactions and feedback that should be considered depend on the agency doing the
modeling. The government, for example, might be interested in potential destabilization after
removing a drug lord, economic impact of hiring more police officers, strain on the judicial
system for more arrests or level of public trust after a major intervention. Additionally, the
government may want to know whether to invest more money into education, welfare programs,
security or into attracting international companies that bring jobs. As a result, the interactions
that they consider should include how education affects young people joining gangs or how
crime discourages foreign investors from bringing their businesses into the country. Similarly,
other stakeholders would look at the interactions pertinent to their reason for analysis.
Participatory Modeling
Various stakeholders could use systems analysis, particularly system dynamics modeling,
to analyze how they could contribute to the crime reduction strategies. Additionally, the analysis
might make government efforts more transparent and assist in evaluating the government's
79http://www.systemdynamics.org/DL-IntroSysDyn/stock.htm
117
interdiction efforts and related policy initiatives. In the following section, I do a brief
stakeholder analysis, identifying some of the key players in the local system.
Stakeholder Analysis of the Narcotics Trade in T&T
The system dynamics approach illuminates the roles that stakeholders play. The key
stakeholders can be divided into the governing bodies, the local community and the international
bodies. Drug lords and gang members may fall into the local community or international bodies,
but for the purposes of this analysis, I consider them separately.
Governing bodies
- Government: wants a reduction in crime in order to win legitimacy and votes for the next
election and to attract international investment which will improve economic conditions in
the country
- The Police Force: wants a reduction in crime because it improves their relationship with the
community and the prestige of their titles. Additionally, reduced crime can make their jobs
easier and support for crime prevention can keep their budget and manpower high
Local Community
- Community, general: want to not live in fear and want crime to stop
- Civic Leaders: represent the community and want crime to stop
- Church Officials: implement programs to get young people out of the gangs and into more
productive projects
- Deportees: many of whom are young men with limited ties to the country and are sometimes
viewed as criminals
- Youth, some: want financial security, protection or a sense of belonging so they are tempted
to join gangs
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- Local Businessmen: want less crime because crime increases the costs of doing business. A
notable exception are security firms, which may be thriving due to the high crime rate and
insecurity (Griffith 1996)
- Media: controls the information that the community receives and the manner that they
receive it
Perpetrators
- Drug Lords (also part of community or international players): want to increase their business
without trouble from the police
- Gang members (also part of community): want to make a living, protect their families and
themselves as well as gain power and wealth. They do not want the police interfering with
their business
International bodies
- International law enforcement: want to stop the flow of cocaine through the T&T so that the
cocaine does not come to their countries
- Businessmen: want to invest in T&T without the additional security risks and costs
- International NGOs: want a reduction in crime as they usually serve the poor and needy in
the community, who are the most vulnerable to crime
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Stakeholder Control/Power Matrix
The table below highlights some of the key power relationships among the stakeholders.
I recognize that this is a generalized list, as within each stakeholder group there are differing
incentives and desires. The table reads: the [column] has control over the [row]:
Table 14: Control/Power Matrix
Governing bodies Local community Criminals International bodies
Control resources, can
Elects them back in hurt the reputation of
office, may strike or Destroy their the country, may
Governing protest if they disagree legitimacy, bribe determine socio-
bodies with their actions officials economic conditions
Enforce laws, allocate Increase fear, prey on
Local funding, establish the vulnerable to
community social programs increase their numbers Control resources
Can make arrest, Can help the local law
reduce profits from Can report them to the enforcement reduce
Criminals criminal activity police criminal activity
Can restrict
accessibility to Can choose not to
International country's resources participate in their Cause them not to
bodies and people programs invest in T&T
Stakeholder roles in reducing crime
All of the major stakeholders play a part in working to reduce the crime and drug
problem in T&T. The figure below identifies some of the challenges faced when the groups do
not cooperate. Criminals are not included in the circles as it is not in their best interests for the
crime to be reduced.
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Figure 62: Diagram showing the need for multiple stakeholder engagement
Goveming Bodies
Alternatives to current global law enforcement strategies
Otto Perez Molina, President of Guatemala has stated that the war on drugs has failed and
he suggests that participation in the cocaine trade should be decriminalized and the cocaine trade
regulated. In fact, he thinks that drugs should be treated as a public health issue80. Due to the
exogenous nature of the cocaine trade for T&T, if the global system decriminalized and
80 President Otto Perez Molina, "We have to find new solutions to the drugs nightmare", The Guardian, April 7,
2012. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/apr/07/latin-america-drugs-nightmare.
Kenny, Charles, "The Narco State", Foreign Policy, July 27, 2012.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/16/the narco state?page=0,0
121
regulated the trade, then the spillover effects would potentially lessen. If the shipping of cocaine
were legal, other types of protection, like auto-id tags or bar codes, could be used when moving
the goods and the need for guns, bribery and subterfuge would be reduced.
However, in isolation, T&T could not reduce penalties for those involved in
transshipment, because that would increase trafficking through T&T, and make local people
more vulnerable to becoming drug mules. Additionally, it would worsen immigration actions
against Trinidadians and Tobagonians when they travel, as they will all be seen as potential
traffickers (Griffith 1996). Decriminalization would need to be done on a global scale, and not
only on a local one.
Recommendations for the Trinidad & Tobago Police Service (TTPS)
In the previous chapters, I identified, through the review of literature and analysis of the
crime situation in T&T, that one of the problems that led to higher crime in the country is the
lack of faith in the TTPS. Additionally, I noted policies that the government should focus on to
deal with the rising crime levels and the drug trade through the country. In this section, I
consider steps that the leadership of TTPS could take to bring about change both within the
organization and in the community to improve their reputation. I use Andrew's (2010) "Big
Stuck", Pritchett's (2010) "Isomorphic Mimicry" and Kezar's (2001) theories on organizational
change to come up with a preliminary implementation plan for the TTPS.
The TTPS is in a "Big Stuck" 81 situation, as described by Andrews et al. (2010),
whereby the need for change is great, as the TTPS realizes that their current actions are not
reducing crime, but the method of change is unknown and the space for change is questionable.
Problems are usually a good medium to introduce change, and for the TTPS the increasing crime
and murder rate provide an opening for change agents.
81 The "Evolutionary Ecosystem" and the "Big Stuck" concepts were discussed by Andrews, Matt, (2011,
September 26). MLD-102 Getting Things Done, Management in the Development Context. Harvard
Kennedy School course. Lecture conducted from Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, MA. Andrews is an
Associate Professor at the Harvard Kennedy School.
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'Isomorphic mimicry', a term coined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and used by
Pritchett (2010), describes the situation where organizations, who depend on external legitimacy
for funding and support but do not have the capability to perform, act as expected in order to
continue receiving the support. For example, the government of T&T has 17 agencies that look
at the drug problem and passing about 9 bills in 11 years, all of which follow external best
practices that the government adopts to show that it is working to reduce crime. As a result, on
paper, the government is doing many crime interdictions, but it may just be rhetoric and not in
practice.
In this section, I make some suggestions about ways to bring about change for the TTPS.
First, I look at the Evolutionary ecosystem for the TTPS to determine whether there is space for
change within the TTPS. Following that, I look at some organizational change theory and
consider what TTPS's motivations for change are. Finally, I make some recommendations that
may help TTPS open the space for change and improve their relationship with the community.
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The space for change
Figure 63:TTPS Organizational Ecosystem
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The TTPS is part of an organizational ecosystem, and at the lowest level are the 'Agents',
the police officers and the commissioner, who interact directly with the community. At the top
level is the system where the TTPS exists; this system includes the Ministry of National Security,
the government, the community, as all of these are external bodies that give TTPS its legitimacy.
In the figure above, the right hand side describes an open organization that is easily adaptable
and the left hand side describes a closed organization that is unable to meet its challenges.
Matthews et al. (2012) state that organizations that operate on the left fall victim to capability
traps and often times the agents are blamed for failure of the system.
From my assessment of the TTPS, through reading policies, talking to people and
newspaper articles, I posit that
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- the system is 'open' as the TTPS is investing in new programs, such as Crime and Problem
Analysis Branch and the National Drug Observatory
- the actions of the TTPS are determined by the current government whose goals are short-
sighted because they need to show results in order to be re-elected. As a result, the
evaluation of novelty is determined by the TTPS's 'agenda conformity'
- the 'organizational effectiveness' come from 'external legitimacy' and demonstrated
success. Although demonstrated success is important, the organization's effectiveness
depends on whether the community or the government sees them as being successful.
Case in point, the crime rate in T&T is decreasing, but the TTPS is still seen as being
ineffective
- the police officers and their leadership have many regulations to follow as such their
choices are limited; however, they are given some leeway to make change. As a result,
the 'agents' component of the system could go in both directions
Consequently, overall TTPS is open to change.
Current Evolutionary Ecosystem
Using Kezar's (2001) theories on organizational change, political, cultural and social
cognition forces are the most dominant ones acting on the TTPS.
Political: The demands for reduced crime by the government and for protection by
citizens interplay with the increased use of violence by criminals and counteract the request that
the TTPS is more community friendly; these factors contribute to the political system that the
TTPS faces.
Cultural: As the criminal element becomes more powerful in T&T, the culture of the
country is changing; people are living in fear and their actions reflect their insecurity; criminals
are becoming more violent and bold as they lose respect for the police and institutions in the
country. The TTPS is charged with keeping their legitimacy as all of these changes occur in the
society around them; this lends Kezar's cultural theory for change.
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Social Cognition: Internally, the TTPS recognizes that their modus operandi has not
been effective in curbing crime and that they need to re-think their strategies and ways of doing
business, Kezar's social cognition theory, this is evident
through their adoption of new programs and strategies.
Isomorphism: The combination of the above
evolutionary life cycles support Maggio's (1983)
isomorphic theory of change as the TTPS has political
forces acting on it, it needs to maintain its legitimacy, and
it answers to many external actors (Maggio & Powell
1983). The biggest threat to the validity of the Police
Force is the perception of the people; when people lose
all respect and trust in the TTPS, then it will be most
ineffective.
Figure 64: Organizational Change Forces
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Organization Change Motivation
Based on my analysis, the major motivation of the TTPS is the "external who", i.e., the
actions are fueled by the need for external legitimacy. As officers are motivated by how they are
perceived both by the government, who controls their resources, and by the community.
Decreasing the crime rate in T&T also motivates officers, in that sense the "what", or the results,
contributes to their actions. The "how" motivator is a minor factor because police officers
follow a set of guidelines that have been set up in the system, so their actual procedures have
been handed to them. The "internal who" motivator is also a minor factor in this category,
because promotions are historically based on seniority, so employee satisfaction matters because
low salaries and frustration at the job may create susceptibility to bribe taking. (Andrews 2011,
September 14)
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Strategies for the TTPS
The TTPS has started many initiatives to help improve its capacity and its relationship
with the community, this section highlights some of the programs that should be implemented,
reinforced or re-instituted.
Change 1: Improve Messaging
The TTPS should not have a "War on Crime" campaign, like the SOE, instead they
should frame their approach as more of a "Police In the Community" or a "We Care" plan. The
"War on Crime" just increases the distrust between the communities and the police, whereas a
softer campaign would hopefully get the groups together. This is similar to the re-branding that
the TTPS tried in 2007 with the 'Policing for the People' initiative that according to Wallace
(2011) was discontinued for no known reason.
Change 2: Build Acceptance
The TTPS leadership needs to identify the major problems within the Police Force
through feedback programs both within the force and externally. The Police Complaints
Authority Act allows for external feedback; so the following steps are for internal feedback
systems. The TTPS leadership should:
- Conduct a two-phase anonymous survey. Let Phase 1 be open-ended questions to the
officers about their thoughts on the identifying the deficiencies of the TTPS. Based on
the responses in Phase 1, do another survey with similar questions, but with multiple
choice answers, to identify what officers think are the biggest problems affecting the
TTPS.
- Form two types of groups within the Police Force to look at change in the TTPS, one type
made up with the senior officers because they know the system well. The second type
should be with a demographically diverse range of officers who leadership has identified
as invested in serving the country.
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- Invite members of the community to form voluntary groups to discuss what is needed to
improve the TTPS. These meetings should be held regionally once a quarter and a meal
should be provided to encourage attendance. This suggested process differs from the
Police Complaints Authority's work because it is not only for citizens to bring forward
failures of the TTPS, but also for citizens to work with the TTPS to come up with
solutions. Wallace (2011) suggests that although there have been seemingly similar
efforts to get community involvement, genuine and regular outreach was lacking.
Additionally, there should be a forum for anonymous suggestions to be made for those
community members who may be afraid of speaking up openly.
- Form a discussion group with incarcerated individuals to discuss the failures in the criminal
justice system as some of the convicts may have many grievances with the system and
may be willing to speak about them. Social workers may be needed to facilitate the
conversations to ensure that they are constructive.
- Compensate officers based on clearly defined performance measures. I was unable to
ascertain how officers were paid, so the TTPS may already be doing this. However, if
they are not, the leadership should ensure that a transparent compensation process exists
that considers various performance metrics, as well as level seniority, to determine
salaries. From the information that I could gather, in 2010, many police officers were
protesting to get the promised salary increasess2 and in one case, a police officer needed
83two jobs in order to support his family . Paying police officers sufficiently would
indicate that their work is being valued and will help them to buy into the change
implementation plan.
82 Taitt, Ria, "Pay police more $$", T&T Express, September 15, 2010.
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/Pay police more -103017719.html
83 Kissoon, Carolyn, "Pastor knock police salaries", T&T Express, August 30, 2010.
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/Pastor knocks police salaries-101851948.html
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Change 3: Improve Ability
The TTPS leadership should:
Get social workers to train police officers in how to deal with the truant young men in the
community, as was suggested by Hon Warner in his new plan to combat crime8 4 . For young
men pride and honor are very important, so when the police officers are derisive or
condescending the young men will become defensive and less open to change. Social workers
who focus on the youth should be hired to have workshops with the officers on how to deal with
young people.
Continue to work with other ministries and agencies that already work in communities.
The Ministry of Culture has organized sporting events for the youth in the towns and villages,
although police officers already serve as security for these events, they should play a greater role
that would allow them more interaction with the young people. Additionally, the TTPS could
reach out to non-governmental and community-based organizations that have youth programs
and help them re-establish community activities that were stopped for safety reasons, especially
in the crime hotspots and areas with continuously high levels of crime. Some such activities
could be:
- Workshops on
o Domestic violence,
o Parenting - to help parents deal with wayward children, because many parents do
not know what to do, and
o How to deal with bullying
These activities would also create jobs for social workers, tutors and coordinators.
Other ways the police could improve their relationship with the community:
- Re-open outposts in areas with high crime prevalence and in the crime hotspots
- More foot patrols, as was started in the 2 1s' Century Policing Initiative8 5
84 T& Guardian, "Jack: $289m more to combat crime", T&T Guardian, August 17, 2012.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2012-08-17/jack-289m-more-combat-crime
85 T&T Newsday, "Deliver the Killers", T&T Newsday, July 17, 2012.
http://www.newsday.co.tt/editorial/0,163437.html
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- Use more female officers in communities with young children
- Expand the Police Service Youth Group:
o Offer scholarships and help to arrange transportation to schools to students who do
not have the means to get to school, especially in the crime hotspots
o Target troubled youth to become more involved with the police youth group
- Use Social Workers (welfare officers) to help deal with trauma in these communities and
to help deal with the repercussions of violence
Further, the government should work with the local university to create a center or think
tank that focuses on analyzing police behavior and improving its efficiency. This would be
different from the Police Complaints Board, where the community can call in to report police
misbehavior, although it can use these reports to guide their analysis. Similarly, it should be
different from the Crime and Problem Analysis Branch of the Police Force that analyzes crime
statistics. This center should be mainly academic and it should look 1) at improvements in law
enforcement globally, and suitable ways for adapting them to T&T and 2) at creating metrics to
determine the effectiveness of the TTPS. This oversight component should protect against
'isomorphic mimicry', i.e. new plans and solutions that get put on paper, but never come to
reality.
In addition to the academic center, a civilian oversight board for the TTPS that meets
once every 6 months should be created and some of the leaders from the local religious bodies,
the NGOs and the CBOs should be invited to join. Additionally, one or two retired principals,
who would undoubtedly understand how to work with truant young people, should be invited to
join as well. The committee should be comprised of people from all the major ethnic groups and
have both men and women on it. Further, the committee should include at least one person in his
or her twenties who could share the issues facing young people with respect to the Police Service
and cocaine.
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Sookraj, Radhica, "Bartlett: 21s"-century policing brought dignity to service", T&T Guardian, August 1, 2012.
http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2012-08-0 1/bartlett-21 st-century-policing-brought-dignity-service
The suggestions list is short, as more ideas would be generated based on the discussions
of the focus groups and surveys.
TTPS Recommendations Conclusion
Changing the public's view about the TTPS would be a long and tiresome process,
according to Lopez et al.'s (2001) model, it may take up to 15 years, but it is necessary for T&T
to see sustained decreases in crime. The Police in T&T have long been seen as the enforcers for
the elite class and there is a legacy of distrust between the groups; however, the police officers
come from the community and this perception could be changed for good. Change in behavior,
in addition to improvements in expertise, is needed to improve the relationship between the
community and the police and in so doing reduce the crime rate.
Of course, implementing such a change requires those in leadership positions within the
institution to recognize the linkages and to be willing to prioritize meaningful change rather than
simply respond to 'establishment' pressure to promote stability and stifle social unrest by simply
getting tougher on crime.
Future Research
- Institutional Analysis of the departments and agencies that deal with some aspect of the
cocaine problem in T&T, to identify effective programs that should be supported, and
failed programs that should be stopped, as well as to determine gaps in what agencies
are doing and what needs to be done
- System dynamics modeling of the potential interventions to determine which ones may
be more effective in reducing the crime rate and to estimate expected times for
projects to work and which combinations are most important
- Case study analysis of how the police and community were able to reduce the kidnapping
rate. Using system dynamics or another modeling tools, feedback mechanisms
should be identified that created the conditions for success
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Concluding Remarks
Results from the systems analysis indicate the importance of coordinated, credible,
sustained efforts as change does not happen immediately. In his April, 2012, announcement,
Minister of National Security, Hon. Warner implied that his new plan will bring change to the
country immediately. He stated "Let me advise you once again, that you shall feel the effects of
the plan, when the plan is implemented it shall be swift, it shall be surgical, it shall be clinical
and this country shall begin a new era of safety" 86. This language is problematic, because it sets
false expectations of results and timing and if the plans fail to reduce crime quickly, the TTPS
would be blamed. Moreover, it may lead to plans being scrapped and new initiatives started
within the next few years, as with other security and policing initiatives.
Although numerous projects have been tried in the past, the overall efforts seem scattered
and/or are victims of isomorphic mimicry. A concerted planning strategy is needed to determine
what level of coordination should occur, which local and international groups should be working
together, and what sequence of events are necessary to make sustainable change. As the changes
may take at least ten years to bring about real results, considerable management and planning
skill must be available to keep the project going over time.
Systems analysis may help provide the framework to determine interventions and to test
their efficacy through modeling. Although this thesis focuses on the government, and
particularly, the TTPS as the modelers, this type of analysis could be useful to make of the
involved organizations. Several of the international NGOs, international corporations and
community-based organizations that are vested in the crime situation in T&T may want to
collaborate on the development and use of this approach to analyze and evaluate conditions in
the country and then advise the government and the community on how to make improvements.
86 Ramdass, Anna, "Jack gets $289m to fight crime", T&T Express, August 16, 2012.
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/Jack gets 289m to fight crime-I 66500876.html
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Appendix 1 - Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Departments
List of Police Service Departments in Trinidad and Tobago
# Department
1 Anti-Kidnapping Squad
2 Community Policing Secretariat
3 Court and Process Branch
4 Crime and Problem Analysis Branch
5 Criminal Investigations Department
6 Criminal Records Office
7 Finance Branch
8 Fraud Squad
9 Guard and Emergency Branch
10 Homicide Bureau
11 Human Resource Branch
12 Inter Agency task Force (IATF)
13 Interpol
14 Modus Operandi
15 Mounted and Canine Section
16 Photography Section
17 Planning and Development Unit
18 Police Armour Shop
19 Police Band
20 Police Training College
21 Repeat Offenders Programme (ROP)
22 Special Reserve Police
23 Stolen Vehicles Squad
24 The Special Branch
25 Transport and Telecommunications Branch
Source:
http://www.ttps.gov.tt/AboutTTPS/Departments.aspx
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